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THE CITIZEN INITIATIVE PETITION TO AMEND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: A CONCEPT WHOSE TIME HAS
PASSED, OR A VIGOROUS COMPONENT OF
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AT THE
STATE LEVEL?
JOHN F. COOPER*
INTRODUCTION
One method by which many state constitutions can be amended is the citizen
initiative petition.' This method of amending a state constitution is authorized in
eighteen states 2 and is a creature3 of relatively recent vintage, with the first such
provision enacted in 1898.'
Although specifics vary from state to state, citizen initiative provisions generally
require that its organizers draft a proposed state constitutional amendment, and
obtain certain percentage of state voters, as determined from some previous
measuring election who consent by their signatures to place the proposed
amendment before the statewide electorate at a time in futuro. Signature
requirements range from three percent5 to fifteen percent6 of the statewide
electorate.
* John F. Cooper is a Professor of Law at Stetson University College of Law. I would like to thank my
friend, colleague, and frequent collaborator Professor Thomas C. Marks, Jr., of Stetson University College of Law
for his assistance during the preparation of this article. Tom disagrees with most of the arguments presented but
always was willing to listen and discuss the merits of the article.
1. See Ame R. Leonard, In Search of the Deliberative Initiative: A Proposalfor a New Method of
Constitutional Change, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1203, 1205-10 (1996) (providing an historical summary of the
development of the ways by which state constitutions can be amended).
2. These states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota.
The constitutional provisions in these states recognizing the availability of constitutional initiatives are: ARIZ.
CONsT. art. XXI, § 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 7; CAL CONSr. art. XV ,I,§ 3; COLO. CONsr. art. V, § 1; FLA. CONsT.
art. XL § 3; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; MASS. CONST. art. XLVmI; MICH. CONsT. art. XIL § 2; Miss. CONST. art.
XV, § 273; MO. CONST. art. I, § 50; MONT. CONSr. art XIV, § 9; NEB. CONSr. art. I, § 2; NEv. CONST. art. 19,
§ 2; N.D. CONsT. art. Ill, § I; Ono CoNsr. art. I, § la; OKIA. CoNsr. art V, § 2; OR. CONST. art. XVIL § 1; S.D.
CONST. art. XXII, § 1.
3. Many states also contain statutory initiative petitions provisions. Although many of the issues are
interrelated and overlap, this paper is concerned only with the process whereby a state constitution may be
amended.
4. See Leonard, supranote 1, at 1207-10 (chronicling the growth of the constitutional initiative process
in the states). In his article Leonard writes:
Prior to 1898, a proposition submitted by the legislature was the only kind of statewide initiative
or referendum used in the United States. In that year, South Dakota became the first state to
include a provision in its constitution allowing direct, statewide initiatives at both the statutory
and constitutional level. Oregon was the first state to make law using the initiative process,
enacting two statutes by initiative in 1904, followed by four constitutional amendments in 1906.
The initiative's success in Oregon fueled an explosive growth of initiative and referendum
provisions in the constitutions and statutes of western states during the first part of the twentieth
century. In 1907, Oklahoma became the first state to provide for initiative and referendum
provisions in its original state constitution, and Arizona followed in 1912. Between 1898 and
1918, nineteen states adopted the initiative in some form, and fourteen of these states allowed
the proposal of constitutional amendments by initiative.
See id. at 1207 (footnotes omitted).
5. See MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII.
6. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

The citizen initiative method of amending a state constitution has come under
7
increasing-in both number and vociferousness-attacks by political observers and
8 These attacks have labeled it a tool of bigots and economic special
legal scholars.
interests.9
To the author, many of their attacks exude a shrillness suggesting they may be
motivated more by elitism or aristocratic individual political philosophies than by
genuine constitutional or legal concerns. Nonetheless, many of the criticisms,
particularly those that are process oriented, suggest, to the author, that the current
constitutional initiative process may be ripe, if not for substantial reform, for some
minor retuning.
A balanced and objective evaluation of the current constitutional initiative
process can be commenced only after considering its historical origins. Like any
and ratified the
other constitutional provision, the intent of the people who drafted
°
provision is a vital part of interpreting it and giving it effect.' Unfortunately, many
critics of the process are unaware, or prefer to remain ignorant, of these historical
origins. This is regrettable since these historical origins have continued relevance
today.
This article will attempt to rectify these perceived shortcomings in the current
debate by presenting a more even-handed evaluation of the current constitutional
initiative process. In striving to accomplish these twin goals, the following topics
will be addressed:
I. The historical origins of the constitutional citizen initiative process will be
addressed. The Oklahoma Constitution, which was the first state constitution to
include such a provision when first adopted, will be used as a reference point.
II. Current criticisms of the constitutional initiative process will be identified,
analyzed, and responded to. For ease of presentation and discussion, these criticisms
have been divided into three broad categories.
A. Criticisms concerning the proper allocation of power between the states and
federal government under the United States Constitution.

7. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Californocracy in Action, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1997, at A21. The flavor

of such attacks can be gleaned from a recent column:
California, which fancies itself the pacesetter for all things American, has invented a truly
amazing form of government. It bears no resemblance to the traditional notions of a republic that
filled the heads of the Founders in Philadelphia. But what the heck! No one wears powdered
wigs to the beach either.

In California, the voters do their thing by passing initiatives that determine taxes, set budget
priorities and chart social policy--all the big questions. Then the courts step in and do their
thing, often declaring the initiatives partly or wholly unconstitutional.
On the sidelines in this whole process are the elected representatives of the people-the very
folks we thought of, in our naive days as a nation, as the proper repository of governmental
power.
It is really weird to watch Californocracy in action, as I have been doing for the last couple
of weeks.
Id.

8. See Elizabeth R. Leong, Ballot Initiatives and Identifiable Minorities: A Textual Call to Congress, 28
RurGERS LJ. 677 (1997); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Law Making Is Not "Republican Government": The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L REV. 19 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Richard Fitch, Initiative Mania, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sep. 16, 1990, at C2.
10. See, e.g., Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 122 (N.C. 1980).
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B. Criticisms concerning the proper allocation of state power under a state
constitution.
C. Criticisms concerning the manner by which citizen initiative petitions are
currently administered.
I. A few conclusions will be drawn and several recommendations made.
Most of the analysis and reasoning is based on the author's research and legal
experiences. As much of that experience and research has focused in the states of
Oklahoma and Florida, many references in this article are to the constitutions and
political cultures of those states. However, the reasoning and conclusions are
applicable elsewhere.
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE CITIZEN INITIATIVE PETITION TO
AMEND A STATE CONSTITUTION
In the relatively few instances in which the United States Supreme Court has
discussed the merits of state and local initiative and referendum processes, the
Court has generally viewed these participatory processes as important and positive
components of American government and democracy. Justice Hugo Black referred
to the processes as reflecting a "devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination
or prejudice."" Chief Justice Warren Burger analogized the process to the venerable
New England town meeting.' Conceding that under our constitutional system the
people in establishing a legislature are also free to reserve to themselves power that
might normally be expected to be allocated to a legislature, Burger lauded the
initiative and referendum process as "a means for direct political participation."' 3
Justice Tom Clark, in his concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr,4 indicated that he
found the apportionment claim in that landmark case justiciable only because the
Tennessee electorate was not able to obtain political relief elsewhere via the
initiative or referendum process. 5
Other sources have also recognized beneficial attributes of the citizen initiative
process. Some have observed that initiatives not only serve an important role in
educating voters and involving citizens in the political process, but also serve as a
source of innovation in state lawmaking and as a means of correcting some of the
abuses of representative government. 6 Citizen initiatives also serve as a safety
valve for voter frustration when a state government effectively ignores the wishes
of the electorate.

11. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
12. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1976).
13. Id. at 673.
14. 369 U.S. 186, 251 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
15.
Although I find the Tennessee apportionment statute offends the Equal Protection Clause, I
would not consider intervention by this Court into so delicate a field if there were any other
relief available to the people of Tennessee. But the majority of the people of Tennessee have no
"practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls" to correct the existing
"invidious discrimination." Tennessee has no initiative and referendum.
Id. at 258-59.
16. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 1, at 1211-19.
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In 1898, South Dakota became the first state to permit the amendment of its
constitution by this mechanism.' 7 Between 1898 and 1918, fourteen additional
states adopted provisions permitting citizen initiative petitions to propose
constitutional amendments.'5 Of the states admitted to the Union during the first
half of the twentieth century, only New Mexico failed to include an effective
9
initiative and referendum provision in its state constitution.' Despite this failure,
the topic was one of the most contested issues at the New Mexico Constitutional

Convention of

1910.20

The concentration of the adoption of constitutional initiative provisions in the
first few decades of the twentieth century is neither a coincidence nor an accident.
The initiative was one of the leading goals of the Populist and Progressive political
movements in the United States.2' At this period of time, these movements were at
their most politically potent.
22
The citizen initiative petition is commonly labeled a "populist" device. During
the author's lifetime, the term "populist" has been used to label diverse political
figures and philosophies. The term has been to describe both George and Henry
Wallace, and Joseph and Eugene McCarthy. More recently it has been used to
describe both Bill Clinton and Pat Buchanan. The only constant conclusion is that
the term "populist" in modem usage has become primarily a pejorative-a negative
label placed on one with whom the speaker or writer politically disagrees. As the
term appears frequently in this article, it is important to define the term carefully
and fairly, in its proper historical context, to dispel any negative connotations that
might arise in the minds of those only familiar with its current misusage.
While Populism with a capital "P" describes a short-lived American political
23
party that functioned during the last decade of the Nineteenth Century, populism
with a lower case "p" represents an American political movement that owes its
maturation to the political beliefs of Thomas Jefferson, but which predates even the
American Revolution.24 American populism has been described by one leading
25
observer as the one constant political "ism" in American politics.
17. See S.D. CONST. art. XXII, § I.
18.

See DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATURE: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED

STATES, 38-39 (1984).
19. See Leonard, supra note 1, at 1207, and sources cited therein.
20. See DOROTHY L CLINE, NEW MEXaCO'S 1910 CONSTruiON: A 19TH CENTURY PRODUCT, 49-45 (1985);
Edward D. Tittmann, New Mexico ConstitutionalConvention: Recollections, 27 N.M. HIST. REV. 177 (1952).
21. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY-THE POLmCS OF INITATiE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL
43-50 (1989); see also P.K. Jameson & Marsha Hosack, Citizen Initiatives in Florida:An Analysis of Florida's
ConstitutionalInitiative Process, Issues and Alternatives, 23 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 417, 421-22 (1995). See
generally JOHN D. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT, 404-07 (1961).
22. See HICKS, supra note 21, at 406-07.
23. See GEORGE MCKENNA, AMERICAN POPULISM, xi-xii (1974).

24. See id. at xii.
25. See id.
True, historic Populism lasted no more than a decade, but the soil that nourished it was rich
enough to support other strains of populism, and these have cropped up with seasonal regularity
down to our present time. Populism, then, is not a sometime thing which puts in an occasional
appearance in America. It is the perennial American "ism," with its roots extended at least as
far back as the American Revolution and a development which, while directed toward different
objects at different times, has never obliterated the essential qualities which stamp it as a
uniquely American movement.
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American populism has always trusted the collective instincts of the American
people and questioned the actions and motives of politicians, judges, and other
elites. Thomas Jefferson succinctly delineated the underlying bedrock principles of
the movement when he wrote:
I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people
themselves, and, if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their
control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but
to inform their discretion by education. This is the true corrective of abuses of
constitutional power."'
In many ways the current debate on citizen initiative petitions is merely the most
recent chapter in our oldest national political debate, the same debate that forged the
creation of our major political parties and is most clearly exhibited in the
ideological differences between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson.
American populists, distrustful of financial cliques, interests, and elites, sought
ways to check the power of these groups by subjecting their actions to the review
of the electorate. The citizen initiative petition is a by-product of this movement.
The 1907 Oklahoma Constitution was the first state constitution to include a
citizen initiative provision when first adopted.27 In many ways, the Oklahoma
Constitutional Convention represents the highwater mark of the populist movement
in the United States. In this convention, populist and progressive thinking
dominated and guided the agenda.
J.F. King, who was elected president pro-tempore of the Oklahoma
Constitutional Convention, captured the mood of the delegates and articulated the
rationale behind citizen initiatives when he identified the biggest threat to
democracy as an "uncontrolled" legislature.2"

Like socialism and communism, populism raises the question of income distribution and
protests against economic privilege... But, unlike socialism or communism, populism proceeds
not on the basis of class analysis but on the division of the nation into an overwhelming majority
of "plain people," on the one hand, and a relative handful of very un-plain, very sophisticated,

very scheming conspirators, on the other.
But beyond this
reason was a deeper one, connected with a central assumption of the populist
credo. The populist believes that the "plain people" of America, which for him includes almost
everyone, are in basic agreement with one another about what is right and wrong, fair and foul,
legitimate and crooked. Fancy dialectics are unnecessary to discover these kinds of truths: we
need only search our hearts. And our hearts are basically the same. The populist cannot bring
himself to believe that the social environments of different Americans can set them thinking

differently about fundamentals. Economic determinism is anathema to him. So is anything, e.g.,
black power, which might divide his countrymen by ethnic or racial lines.
Id. at xii-xiv.
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprinted in MCKENNA, supra note
23, at 22.
27. See Leonard, supranote 1,at 1207 & n.23.
28. See Transcript of Proceedings of Oklahoma Constitutional Convention 89 (1906 - 1907)(on file with

the author and available upon request)(hereinafter Oklahoma Convention Transcript).
More than a hundred years of experience in popular government in the United States has
demonstrated that the great problem confronting the American people in constitution making
is not so much to control or limit the executive as to control and properly limit the legislative
department. By this latter department have people been despoiled. And while the Constitutions
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The President of the Constitutional Convention, and later depression-era
Governor of Oklahoma, William H. "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, specifically linked this
29
same theme of legislative distrust to the adoption of the initiative process. In his
opening address to the Convention, Murray identified a number of provisions he felt
should be included in the Constitution, one of which was the initiative.
We should adopt the initiative and referendum, patterned after the law in force
in the Republic of Switzerland and the State of Oregon. The only argument
offered against this system is that the people are not conservative, while the
history of the optional power shows that the people are more conservative than
reform leaders. The fact that the people have this power will prevent bribery of
the members of the Legislature.The fact that they have this power will make it

unnecessary to use it. It has been in force in Switzerland since 1874 and has
been used but four times, and twice when used the people voted down the
government ownership of certain utilities."
"Alfalfa Bill" Murray's observation that the "fact that they have this power will
make it unnecessary to use it"" may have been overly optimistic, but it was
insightful. Murray envisioned the initiative as a means of guiding and pressuring the
legislature to perform its duties.32 If the legislature was responsive to the popular
will, the electorate would have no need to resort to the initiative. It would only be
in those instances when the legislative branch refused, or failed to act, that the
electorate would guide, pressure, or ultimately act for the legislature through the
citizen initiative. In either instance, whether the legislature acted or failed to act,
democratic values would ultimately prevail.
Murray did not view the initiative as diminishing representative government.
Rather, representative government was enhanced by giving the people a method to
insure their representatives acted honestly and responsively. Although ideological
adversaries from different political parties, this was an issue upon which Murray
33
and President Theodore Roosevelt ultimately agreed. In 1912, Roosevelt declared
his support for state initiatives indicating they "should be used not to destroy
representative government, but to correct it whenever it becomes misrepresenta-

of the different states contain the germ and principles of good government, and while it is true
of law as it is of farming that out of the old fields cometh the new corn, nevertheless these
principles have been stated in such general terms and with so little provisions for their
application to the affairs of the people that little assistance can be derived from them in the way
of administrative government.
Id.

29. Nor was this general distrust of government limited to the legislative branch. During the decades
immediately preceding the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention, courts in other states had evidenced in their
decisions an unbridled hostility to social legislation. Frequently, state courts invalidated such legislation through
resort to expansive and innovative interpretation of state and federal constitutional law. Increasingly, state courts
attempted to restrain such legislative action though resort to "uncertain, ili-defined concepts of natural law." The

availability of the citizen initiative engrafted into the state constitution a means by which the people could amend
this basic governing document, and in so doing overturn the actions of corrupt or and activist judges pursuing their
personal political agendas through their rulings. See discussion at Thornton, Oklahoma Constitutional Studies of
the Oklahoma Constitutional Survey and Citizen Advisory Committee (1950).
30. Oklahoma Convention Transcript, supra note 28, at 22-23 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 23.
32. See id.
33. See DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CMZEN LAW MAKERS-THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION, 9 (1989).
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tive. '"' Woodrow Wilson, initially an initiative opponent, ultimately became a
convert while serving as Governor of New Jersey: "We are cleaning house and in
order to clean house the one thing we need is a good broom. Initiative and
Referendums are good brooms. 35
Recent successful and failed citizen initiative amendments to the Florida
Constitution may illustrate Murray, Wilson, and Roosevelt's point. Since 1968, the
Florida Constitution has contained a provision permitting its amendment by citizen
initiative petition. Like many states, Florida's experience with the citizen initiative
petition has been mixed.36 However, in a number of instances, the provision has
operated precisely as Murray and Roosevelt predicted.
The first successful use of the citizen initiative petition in Florida was the 1976
adoption a constitutional amendment titled "Ethics in Government," which, inter
alia, imposed financial disclosure requirements on candidates to public office. 7

34. Id.
35. Id. at 10. Wilson subsequently reiterated his conversion in 1911.
For twenty years I preached to the students of Princeton that the Referendum and the Recall was
bosh. I have since investigated and I want to apologize to those students. It is the safeguard of
politics. It takes power from the boss and places it in the hands of the people.
CRONIN, supra note 21, at 38.
36. See Thomas C. Marks, Constitutional Change Initiated by the People: One State's Unhappy
Experience, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1241 (1995).

37. Florida Constitution article II,section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Ethics in government-A public office is a public trust. The people shall have the
right to secure and sustain that trust against abuse. To assure this right:
(a) All elected constitutional officers and candidates for such offices and, as may be
determined by law, other public officers, candidates, and employees shall file full and public
disclosure of their financial interests.
(b) All elected public officers and candidates for such offices shall file full and public
disclosure of their campaign finances.
(c) Any public officer or employee who breaches the public trust for private gain and any
person or entity inducing such breach shall be liable to the state for all financial benefits
obtained by such actions. The manner of recovery and additional damages may be provided by
law.
(d) Any public officer or employee who is convicted of a felony involving a breach of public
trust shall be subject to forfeiture of rights and privileges under a public retirement system or
pension plan in such manner as may be provided by law.
(e)No member of the legislature or statewide elected officer shall personally represent
another person or entity for compensation before the government body or agency of which the
individual was an officer or member for a period of two years following vacation of office. No
member of the legislature shall personally represent another person or entity for compensation
during term of office before any state agency other than judicial tribunals. Similar restrictions
on other public officers and employees may be established by law.
(f) There shall be an independent commission to conduct investigations and make public
reports on all complaints concerning breach of public trust by public officers or employees not
within the jurisdiction of the judicial qualifications commission.
(g) This section shall not be construed to limit disclosures and prohibitions which may be
established by law to preserve the public trust and avoid conflicts between public duties and
private interests.
(h) Schedule-On the effective date of this amendment and until changed by law:
(1)Full and public disclosure of financial interests shall mean filing with the secretary
of state by July Iof each year a sworn statement showing net worth and identifying each asset
and liability in excess of $1,000 and its value together with one of the following:
a. A copy of the person's most recent federal income tax return; or
b. A sworn statement which identifies each separate source and amount of income
which exceeds $1,000. The forms for such source disclosure and the rules under which they are
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This initiative did not spring unexpectedly into the political arena. Rather, as
contemporaneous news reports clearly reflect, then Governor Reuben Askew
resorted to the initiative out of frustration.3" Prior to the amendment, the legislature
had regularly and routinely failed to enact financial disclosure requirements in the
face of widespread popular support for such measures. The requisite signatures for
this petition were obtained by unpaid volunteers.3 9 The initiative imposing such
financial disclosure requirements ultimately passed with seventy-nine percent of the
vote,' and was subsequently upheld by the courts-ironically in lawsuits filed by
members of the state legislature.4 Had the legislature been more responsive to the
electorate's will, the resort to the initiative would not have been necessary. The
existence of the initiative process served to police the unresponsive actions of
elected representatives.
An even more recent example of the interaction between the electorate and an
unresponsive legislature is illustrated by a recent amendment prohibiting gill net
fishing within Florida waters.42 Once again this issue did not magically appear in
the Florida political arena without advance warning. Rather, the organizers of the
petition resorted to the initiative only when multiple pleas to the legislative and
executive branches had been ignored.4" In describing legislative attempts to limit the

to be filed shall be prescribed by the independent commission established in subsection (f), and
such rules shall include disclosure of secondary sources of income.
(2) Persons holding statewide elective offices shall also file disclosure of their financial
interests pursuant to subsection (h)(1).
(3) The independent commission provided for in subsection (f) shall mean the Florida
Commission on Ethics.
FLA. CONST. art. IL § 8.
38. An op-ed article in the Washington Post in 1979 by David Cohen, then president of Common Cause,
described the Florida experience:
The Florida disclosure provision was a result of a series of political scandals that rocked the
state in the early 1970s. Florida's comptroller, treasurer, superintendent of education and three
judges were involved in scandals. The state legislature repeatedly refused to take effective steps
to correct the conflict-of-interest abuses.
In response to this record of official misconduct, Florida voters in the 1976 election
overwhelmingly supported an initiative known as the Sunshine Amendment. Approved by 79
percent of the voters, the amendment mandates disclosure of campaign finances, sets standards
for official conduct and requires public officials to file financial-disclosure statements.
David Cohen, Sunshine is Good ForYou, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1979, at A23.
39. See, e.g., PetitionBill is Unconstitutional,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 27, 1991, at 26A, describing
the citizens petition to add the ethics provision to the Florida Constitution:
It's hard to get enough signatures (currently required: 363,886) to put a proposed
constitutional amendment on a Florida ballot so hard, in fact, that former Gov. Reubin Askew
is the only sponsor who ever succeeded in doing it without paying people to circulate the
petitions. His "Sunshine Amendment," requiring public officials to disclose their finances, was
the result.
Id.
40. See Cohen, supranote 38, at A23.
41. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 437 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Fla. 1977); Plante v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933 (Fla.
1979).
42. Some observers question the appropriateness of including provisions regulating gill nets in a state
constitution. This issue is addressed infra at Section II B(i).
43. FLORIDA CONSTrrUTION article 10, section 16 provides:
Section 16. Limiting Marine Net Fishing.(a) The marine resources of the State of Florida belong to all of the people of the state and
should be conserved and managed for the benefit of the state, its people, and future generations.
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amendment after the enactment, one major state newspaper described the
legislature's maneuverings:
Florida lawmakers are at it again, trying to undermine coastal fishing
regulations. Every year the Legislature seeks to intimidate, weaken or abolish

To this end the people hereby enact limitations on marine net fishing in Florida waters to protect
saltwater finfish, shellfish, and other marine animals from unnecessary killing, overfishing and
waste.
(b) For the purpose of catching or taking any saltwater finfish, shellfish or other marine
animals in Florida waters:
(1) No gill nets or other entangling nets shall be used in any Florida waters; and
(2) In addition to the prohibition set forth in (1), no other type of net containing more than
500 square feet of mesh area shall be used in nearshore and inshore Florida waters. Additionally.
no more than two such nets, which shall not be connected, shall be used from any vessel, and
no person not on a vessel shall use more than one such net in nearshore and inshore Florida
waters.
(c) For purposes of this section:
(1) "gill net" means one or more walls of netting which captures saltwater finfish by
ensnaring or entangling them in the meshes of the net by the gills, and "entangling net" means
a drift net, trammel net, stab net, or any other net which captures saltwater finfish, shellfish, or
other marine animals by causing all or part of heads, fins, legs, or other body parts to become
entangled or ensnared in the meshes of the net, but a hand thrown cast net is not a gill net or an
entangling net
(2) "mesh area" of a net means the total area of netting with the meshes open to comprise
the maximum square footage. The square footage shall be calculated using standard
mathematical formulas for geometric shapes. Seines and other rectangular nets shall be
calculated using the maximum length and maximum width of the netting. Trawls and other bag
type nets shall be calculated as a cone using the maximum circumference of the net mouth to
derive the radius, and the maximum length from the net mouth to the tail end of the net to derive
the slant height. Calculations for any other nets or combination type nets shall be based on the
shapes of the individual components
(3) "coastline" means the teritorial sea base line for the State of Florida established pursuant
to the laws of the United States of America
(4) "Florida waters" means the waters of the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits
of Florida, and any other bodies of water under the jurisdiction of the State of Florida, whether
coastal, intracoastal, or inland, and any port thereof; and
(5) "nearshore and inshore Florida waters" means all Florida waters inside a line three miles
seaward of the coastline along the Gulf of Mexico and inside a line one mile seaward of the
coastline along the Atlantic Ocean.
(d) This section shall not apply to the use of nets for scientific research or governmental
purposes.
(e) Persons violating this section shall be prosecuted and punished pursuant to the penalties
provided in section 370.021(2)(a),(b),(c)6, and 7, and (e), Florida Statutes (1991), unless and
until the legislature enacts more stringent penalties for violations thereof. On and after the
effective date of this section, law enforcement officers in the state are authorized to enforce the
provisions of this section in the same manner and authority as if a violation of this section
constituted a violation of Chapter 370, Florida Statutes (1991).
(f) It is the intent of this section that implementing legislation is not required for enforcing
any violations hereof, but nothing in this section prohibits the establishment by law or pursuant
to law of more restrictions on the use of nets for the purpose of catching or taking any saltwater
finfish, shellfish, or other marine animals.
(g) If any portion of this section is held invalid for any reason, the remaining portion of this
section, to the fullest extent possible, shall be severed from the void portion and given the fullest
possible force and application.
(h) This section shall take effect on the July 1 next occurring after approval hereof by vote
of the electors.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 8.
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the Marine Fisheries Commission, the agency that formulates state fishing
regulations.
It was precisely such political meddling that led to voters' overwhelming
endorsement last fall of the Save Our Sealife constitutional amendment, which
bans the use of commercial gill nets in state waters. This extreme measure will
put many commercial netters out of work, some unnecessarily so.
Voters probably never would have backed the restriction if they had
confidence the state would implement the tough regulations necessary to protect
saltwater fish populations. But too often citizens had seen the governor and
Cabinet members, who have the final say on Marine Fisheries Commission
proposals, reject biologists' advice. Too often they had seen lawmakers scheme,

at the behest of special interests, to gut saltwater regulations."
Like the ethics in government amendment, the gillnet provision had broad
popular support. When the legislature ignored this broad support, the electorate
acted for it by approving the amendment with more than seventy-two percent of the
popular vote.45 The voters corrected the inactivity of unresponsive representative
government, and confidence in democracy, if not the legislature, was maintained. 46
In the wake of this type of initiative amendment, a few Florida legislators began
to heed "Alfalfa Bill" Murray's turn of the century admonition. In 1993, the Florida
legislature began considering a proposal to impose a constitutional "tax cap." News
accounts reported that the process of preparing a citizens initiative petition to
impose such a "cap" if the legislature failed to act were already underway.47 In at

44. Lawmakers Launch CoastalAttack, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 23, 1995, at 14.
45. The Orlando Sentinel reported:
Even some who wanted to avoid the constitutional amendment approach can see no other
way. One of those is Tom Fraser, a highly regarded fisheries biologist who is the immediate past
chairman of the Florida Marine Fisheries Commission, the body that is supposed to regulate
netting.
Fraser had hoped to lead the Marine Fisheries Commission to adopt adequate measures. But
every attempt was stymied, and it became clear that certain old-guard powers in the Legislature
with cozy ties to netting would see that nothing substantial was ever accomplished.
Finally, Fraser and the immediate past vice chairman, Ebbie LeMaster, concluded that only a
constitutional amendment would stop the overkills.
Jerry Sansom, The Big Net Debate:Is Ban the Way to Save Sealife? Yes: Runaway Netting CausingFishingCrisis,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 30, 1994, at G4.
46. See Martin Dyckman, Constitution Tampering,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at 3D. Although
Dyckman is generally contemptuous of both the Florida Legislature and the initiative process, he identified the
concern:
Secretary of State Jim Smith may be wrong about the need for a Florida tax cap, but he is
dead right in saying that the Legislature had better propose one before the voters take to the
streets again. There is probably no dumb thing Florida voters won't do if they think it will cut
their taxes. Whatever gets to the ballot first-whether by public petition or by act of the
Legislature-is guaranteed to pass. Who will write the better version: the Republican Party,
which is planning its own initiative petition, or the Legislature that has to pay Florida's bills?
Id.
47. The following letter supporting the amendment captures some of the flavor of the electorate's feelings:
True Grass-roots Movement Spawned Net-Ban Petition
Your June 28 editorial "State net-ban petition exemplifies wrong use of amendment process"
is your second on this subject, and you are grossly misinformed.
I have some unpleasant news for you. Salt-water fishing in Florida stinks. Whether you fish
from a bridge, a boat or a sea wall, your odds of landing something worth keeping have
plummeted from just a few years ago. Anglers have long appealed to state legislators and the
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least partial response to this electoral pressure, the Florida Legislature proposed to
the electorate an amendment imposing such a cap. This proposal was subsequently
enacted, thereby deflating any competing citizen initiative efforts.4" Hopefully, this
recent history is merely a prelude to a more responsive and responsible interaction
between the legislature and the electorate. If so, the initiative is responsible for this
development.
11. CRITICISMS OF THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
The frequently articulated criticisms of the citizen initiative process can be
divided into three separate categories: (i) the proper allocation of power between
state and federal governments under the federal constitution; (ii) concern with the
proper allocation of state power under a state constitution; (iii) the manner by which
citizen petitions are currently administered. Each category will be addressed
separately.
A.

Criticisms Concernedwith the ProperAllocation of PowerBetween State
and Federal Governments Under the United States Constitution

1. Some citizen petitions have been determined violative of federal
constitutional law.
Some critics attack the citizen initiative process by asserting that it frequently
results in the enactment of provisions ultimately held to violate the federal
constitution.4 9 The fact that initiatives are "often unconstitutional," 5 ° has been
identified as one of the ten strongest objections to the creation or extension of the
initiative.5 While some popularly-supported initiatives have been declared
unconstitutional,52 there is very little empirical evidence to suggest that citizen
initiatives are invalidated at a higher rate than constitutional amendments or statutes
originating in state legislatures. Although somewhat dated, one study of forty statelevel initiatives enacted by voters between 1980-1982 indicated that only two

Florida Marine Fisheries Commission to curtail the destruction caused by in-shore commercial
netters, to no avail.
Gill nets are not discriminatory. They kill everything hapless enough to swim into them,
including dolphins and endangered turtles. Shrimp nets scrape the bottom of inshore estuaries,
killing grass and destroying the habitat of young fish. In short, netters have destroyed what was
once regarded as America's fishing paradises.
You state "the initiative process was supposed to be a way for the little guy to make his
voice heard."
That's exactly what the net-ban amendment is, a true grass-roots movement of Florida
citizens who are fed up with the unresponsive politicians. It's a shame this was necessary, but
once it passes all Floridians will benefit.
Craig Wallace. Letter to the Editor, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, June 30, 1993, at IA.
48. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § I(e).
49. SCHMiDT, supra note 33, at 34.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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initiatives were subsequently invalidated on any constitutional ground.5" Regardless,
this argument simply misses the point. If anything, the fact that initiatives are
subject to rigorous federal constitutional scrutiny lends support to the use of
initiatives.
Applying the logic of these initiative critics, one could make a compelling
argument to abolish the judicial and legislative branches of government at both the
state and federal levels. Many of the greatest injustices in American history have
been perpetrated by the legislative branch of government or sanctioned by the
judicial branch. For example, in Korematsu v. United States,"" the United States
Supreme Court upheld executive and legislative actions that excluded persons from
certain areas whose loyalty was not questioned based solely on their race." In
Lochner v. New York," the federal courts temporarily elevated the capitalist
economic system to constitutional protection.57 The United States Supreme Court's
decision in DredScott v. Sanford" also has not rebounded to its everlasting credit.
The Supreme Court's conclusion in each case that the conduct was technically
constitutional is insufficient to mask the injustices perpetrated in those cases.
Nor can state legislatures claim innocence from a similar charge. The racial
segregation statute found constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson59 was enacted by the Louisiana legislature and upheld by the
Louisiana Supreme Court. In addition, the pervasive system of racial segregation
existing across the American South in the first half of the Twentieth Century was
primarily enacted by state legislatures and enforced by state courts.' Accordingly,
the fact that an occasional initiative may be judicially invalidated does not discredit
the process.
The fact that the legislature and the courts have improperly interfered with our
citizens' constitutional rights does not justify the electorate to do the same.
Nevertheless, the fragmentation, diffusion, and dissemination of governmental
61
power are the best available defense of citizen and minority rights. The abolition

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

SCHMIDT, supra note 33, at 34.
323 U.S. 214 (1945).
See id. at 216.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See id.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).

60. A detailed but ultimately incomplete list of state legislatures' interference with minority rights was
prepared by Henry Steele Commager. (Quoted in CRONIN, supra note 21, at 91-92.)
A cumulative list of these might well dishearten even the most optimistic Jeffersonian.
Censorship laws, anti-evolution laws, flag-salute laws, red-flag laws, anti-syndicalists, antisocialist, anti-communist laws, sedition and criminal-anarchy laws, anti-contraceptive
information laws--these and others come all too readily to mind. The New York legislature
purged itself of socialists; the Massachusetts legislature imposed loyalty oaths on teachers; the
Oregon legislature outlawed private schools and the Nebraska legislature forbade the teaching
of German in public schools; the Tennessee legislature prohibited the teaching of evolution; the
Pennsylvania legislature authorized the requirement of a flag-salute from school children; the
Louisiana legislature imposed a discriminatory tax upon newspapers.... The list could be
extended indefinitely.
CRONIN, supra note 21, at 91-92.

61. In Thomas Jefferson's view, leaving the protection of individuals rights to judges employed for life was

a serious error:
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of citizen initiatives would run counter to that goal and would further concentrate
governmental power in the hands of the legislature or the courts. This would be
inimical to all of our civil rights.62

You seem... to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions, a
very dangerous doctrine indeed and one which would place us under the despotism of an
oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men and not more so. They have with others the
same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. Their maxim in bonijudicis
est ampliarejurisdictionem,and their power the more dangerous as they are in office for life
and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control. The constitution has
erected no such single tribunal, knowing that, to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions
of time and party its members would become despots.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprintedin McKENNA, supra note 23, at 22.
62. Initiative elections are frequently viewed, at least by academics, as more likely to produce provisions
that disadvantage racial minorities, when contrasted with legislature. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The
Referendum: Democracy's Barrierto RacialEquality, 54 WASH. L REv. 1 (1978). Like many assumptions in this

area, there is little empirical support for this conclusion. Some studies question the validity of this common
academic assumption. See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination:A PublicChoice Perspective,

67 CM.-KENT L REV. 707 (1991).
A succinct response to the general assumption concerning direct democracy and minority rights appears in a
book review:
Magleby's third point, that legislatures are mor sensitive to the interests of minority groups
than the initiative electorate, also has a logical appeal. Other critics of direct democracy have
made the same point. Pluralist theorists argue that because legislatures represent so many
different interests, building a legislative majority requires the formation of coalitions among
various minorities. Legislators deal with the broad range of issues that come before government,
so that minority groups with differing intensities of preference on different issues may bargain
with other groups for their votes. This legislative log-rolling over a broad agenda brings
minorities into the process and ensures that the resulting compromises will accommodate their
interests. In contrast, the initiative agenda is thin, presenting only a few isolated questions to the
electorate seriatim. Various groups in a statewide electorate cannot sit down and bargain with
each other, with one group pledging support on one initiative in one year in exchange for
support from another group on another ballot proposition in the next year. In theory, then, it is
reasonable to believe that legislatures are more responsive to minority groups than is the
electorate as a whole.
Yet, as with Magleby's praise of legislative rationality, the greater potential for attentiveness
to minority groups has not always been matched in practice. Indeed, it is difficult to argue that
historically minorities-in particular, blacks and other racial minorities-did all that well in
state legislatures. Racial discrimination was largely a product of state legislative action, not
initiative votes. Nor are the great advances of minorities in recent decades attributable to state
legislative action. The initial successes of the civil rights movement were won in the courts or
on the streets. The legislatures resisted and delayed and became more responsive only under
extraordinary political and legal pressures. Even today, in times of fiscal stringency, states may
be more prone to cut programs that help minorities and the poor that) those that serve more
politically powerful groups.
At another level, the challenge to the initiative for lack of sensitivity to minority interests
is misguided; the initiative, like other devices of direct democracy, was designed as a
majoritarian tool, to be used when the legislature failed to act on a program the majority desires.
The appropriate question here is whether the initiative is more likely than the legislature to be
a source of measures that discriminate against minorities or infringe upon the rights of the
politically powerless. Without offering a firm answer, I suggest that there are two institutions
that tend to mitigate the anti-minority potential of direct legislation: the judiciary and the
initiative process itself.
The electorate-as-legislaturecan no more infringe upon constitutionallyprotected rights
than can the representative legislature. Although the courts frequently bestow rhetorical
plaudits on direct democracy, they have not hesitated to invalidate initiative measures as
unconstitutional.Indee4 the recentenhanced use of direct legislation appearsto have called
forth a more aggressivejudicialpolicing of the initiative process and a judicial scrutiny of
initiative proposals for constitutional violations. In 1983, the California Supreme Court
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For example, many view the current federal judiciary as hostile to remedying past
racial discrimination through the use of affirmative action programs.6' A state
citizen initiative petition could attempt to adopt or protect affirmative action
programs that do not violate the federal constitution. An illustration of this recently
occurred in Houston, where in municipal elections held in November 1997, the
electorate rejected a plan to repeal their municipal affirmative action plan." If
initiatives are prohibited by federal law or policy, this would not be permitted, and
the rights of minorities would be left exclusively to a perceived-hostile judiciary.
If the initiative process was somehow totally insulated from federal constitutional
review, the critics' arguments might possess some merit. However, federal and state
courts have aggressively subjected initiative petitions to searching and rigorous
review. The United States Supreme Court has rarely noted, yet alone differentiated,
between whether a particular state provision originated in the state legislature or by
the initiative process. Where the issue has been addressed, it has been dispensed
with summarily. Chief Justice Burger phrased it tersely when he stated: "It is
irrelevant that the voters rather than a legislative body enacted [this law] because
the voters may no more violate the constitution by enacting a ballot measure than
a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation." 65 When it is clear that a
provision was enacted by initiative, it is often unclear in the United States Supreme
Court opinion whether the initiative was a statutory, or constitutional one." The
Court has specifically held that a state constitutional provision falls within the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of a state statute under
the Supremacy Clause.67 This is consistent with the prevailing federal view: "The
Supreme Court has never found it significant that the challenged provision was part
of the state's constitution rather than a simple enactment of its legislature."6 "
Initiative amendments are treated by the federal courts with the same respect and
deference as state statutes. The federal courts have exhibited little reluctance to
enjoin or invalidate citizen petitions they suspect or declare to violate the federal
constitution. One of the more well-publicized citizens initiatives in recent years was
California Proposition 187, which was approved by fifty-nine percent of California
voters during the November 8, 1994 general election.69 This amendment, interalia,

reversed its long standing rle of not engaging in pre-election review of initiative proposals and
struck a proposition from the ballot on constitutional grounds. In 1984, the same court
invalidated a second measure before it could be submitted to the voters and the Florida Supreme
Court twice removed measures from the ballot on constitutional grounds. This judicial
enforcement of the federal and state constitutions goes far to constrain whatever threat direct
legislation may pose to "majority tyranny" than the legislature itself.
See Richard Briffault, Distrustof Democracy, 63 TEX. L REV. 1347, 1363-65 (1985) (reviewing MAGLEBY, supra
note 18)(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
63. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996); Taxman v. Board of Educ. of Piscataway,
91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996). See generally Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education:An
EmpiricalAnalysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions,
72 N.Y.U. L REV. 1 (1997).
64. See Carl Rowan, Houston Voters Embrace Racial Sanity, DENVER PosT, Nov. 10, 1997 at B-09.
65. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981).
66. See Julian Eule, JudicialReview of DirectDemocracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1505 (1990).
67. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,79 (1980).
68. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrtMONAL LAw 647 n.27 (2d ed. 1988).
69. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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purported to prohibit illegal aliens from receiving public services in the State of
California.7 ° Immediately following its enactment, five separate legal challenges
were filed in federal court alleging the unconstitutionality of many of the provisions
of the Proposition.7 These separate actions were consolidated. A federal court, on
November 16, 1994,' temporarily restrained the operation of Proposition 187. On
December 14, 1994, the federal court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.73 On November 20, 1995, the federal court made the preliminary
injunction permanent.74 The permanent injunction remains in effect, while the Ninth
Circuit reviews the federal trial court's action.
A similar pattern is evidenced by California Proposition 209. On November 6,
1996, California voters approved this amendment to the California Constitution.
The amendment, which prohibited discriminatory treatment on a variety of grounds
including race, was viewed by many observers as specifically intending to prohibit
the use of affirmative action by the State of California and its subdivisions. 75 The
day following the approval of Proposition 209, groups opposing it filed suit in
federal court seeking to restrain its enforcement, alleging federal constitutional
violations. The district court promptly entered a temporary restraining order and
later entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the implementation of Proposition
209.76 This injunction remained in effect until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed,77 finding the opponents of Proposition 209 possessed "no likelihood of
success on the merits of their equal protection or pre-emption claims. 7 8 Proposition
209 then became effective when the United States Supreme Court declined to
review the Ninth Circuit's decision.
2. Extensive pre-enforcement judicial review of initiatives prevent their
misuse.
Initiative amendments are also subject to pre- and post-enactment judicial review.
While concededly most pre-enactment judicial review 79 involves a determination
of whether state procedural requirements have been satisfied, not all judicial review
of citizen petitions is so limited. A majority of courts have historically declined to
entertain federal constitutional challenges to an initiative amendment before its
enactment,"0 while other courts have.8" Recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. (There is an error in the court opinion indicating that the preliminary injunction was granted in
1995; it was actually granted in 1994.)
74. See id.
75. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., California's Proposition 209: A Temporary Diversion on the Road to Racial
Disaster, 30 LoY. LA. L REV. 1447 (1997).
76. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
77. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1448 (9th Cir. 1997).
78. Id.
79. See Douglas Michael. Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional Amendments, 14 U.C. DAVIS L REV.
461 (1980) (discussing a decision of the range of pe-enactment judicial review of citizens petitions).
80. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Vaughan, 179 N.W. 553, 556 (1920), (Sharpe, J.,
concurring) (finding such
judicial action to represent "an unwarranted assumption by the courts of the power reserved to the people in the
Constitution").
81. See, e.g., Gray v. Winthrop, 156 So. 270 (Fla. 1934).
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invalidated an initiative petition and precluded it from being presented to the
electorate. 2 It did so on the basis that the petition conflicted with federal
constitutional law as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. 3 This
decision was dubiously predicated, in part, on a desire by the court to "prevent the
holding of a costly and unnecessary election"-normally a legislative rather than
judicial determination.8" Nonetheless, the ruling does evidence an avenue a
particularly activist judiciary can travel in reviewing the federal constitutionality of
an initiative petition."
While it is true that initiative amendments have been invalidated by the federal
courts as violative of the federal constitution, sufficient judicial safeguards are in
effect, including'pre- and post-election review, to make abolishing the initiative
process unjustified. If necessary, restraining orders and injunctions are used to halt
the enforcement of initiative amendments that violate the federal constitution. The
mere fact that an unconstitutional initiative may be approved by the electorate
provides no more justification for abolishing the initiative process than the
possibility that a legislature may enact an unconstitutional statute provides a
justification for abolishing the legislative process.
3. Some legal observers have asserted that citizen initiative amendments
violate the provisions of Article IV, Section 4 of the United States
Constitution, which directs the United States to guarantee to every state a
republican form of government.
Too much ink has been needlessly shed, and too many trees have needlessly died
in support of the proposition that state initiative petitions violate the guarantee
clause of the United States Constitution. As one early proponent of this argument
acknowledged, it is not an argument that probably will ever be heard "in other than
an academic forum."8 6 The United States Supreme Court would have to overturn
well-settled precedent to even reach the proponents' rather strained interpretation
of the historical origins of the guarantee clause. For close to 150 years, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the guarantee clause is nonjusticiable, because the

82. See Inre Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1992).
at 2.
83. Id.
84. Id.
at 8.
85. The author disagrees with the court's opinion in this case but concedes its existence and others like it.
While the author concedes the unconstitutionality of the petition, the author believes it was inappropriate to have
the provision stricken from the ballot. The author's opinion is perhaps best exemplified by the
concurring/dissenting opinion authored by Justice Hodges in that case, which states:
The people have a constitutional right to vent their anger and frustration through the initiative

process in an effort to effect change in their governmenL The proponents are correct that central
core political issues such as abortion should be submitted to a vote of the people when presented
by an initiative petition.
It appears that all parties in this case want the initiative petition submitted to a vote of the
people only to be thwarted by this Court's sua sponte injection of the constitutional issues. A
healing between competing sides of the abortion question may never be reached but perhaps,
if allowed, a vote of the people could be a beginning.
Id.
at 14.
86. James J. Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislature: Postscript to Reitman v.

Mullkey, 55 CoRNELL L REV.881, 908 (1970).
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provision raises political questions only Congress can address. 87 Over eighty-five
years ago, the United States Supreme Court specifically held that the question
whether a state initiative petition violated the federal guarantee clause was a
nonjusticiable political question.88
Despite the clarity of law on this point, a number of innovative-but ultimately
unsatisfying-law review articles have appeared pleading for a reexamination of
these well settled points. Interestingly, these articles seem to be generated whenever
an initiative process results in the enactment or consideration of a provision with
which the writer disagrees. For example, one of the earliest articulations of the
argument appears to be a response to California Initiative Proposition 14 invalidated
by the United States Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey.89 Similarly, a
constitutional initiative amendment characterized as "aimed primarily against
homosexuality," was rejected by the Oregon electorate in November 1992.' 0 Rather
than applauding the enlightened tolerance of the Oregon electorate, a post-election
legal attack was launched upon the initiative process itself.91 The attack viewed
initiatives as arrogating to the electorate decisions that the attacker presumably felt
more properly disposed of by federal judges.'
However entertaining the academic arguments have been, federal courts have
shown little enthusiasm for abandoning their decisions in Luther v. Borden and
PacificStates Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon.93
In Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court cited both Luther v.
Borden and Pacific States.94 Referring to Luther, the Court stated: "But the only
significance that Luthercould have for our immediate purposes is in its holding that
the Guaranty Clause is not a repository of judicially manageable standards which
a court could utilize independently . . . ."" In its most recent analysis of the
guarantee clause, the United States Supreme Court stated that it approached "the
issue with some trepidation,"' in that in most cases in which the clause was raised,

87. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
88. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912). The Court held:
As the issues presented, in their very essence, are, and have long since by this court been,
definitely determined to be political and governmental, and embraced within the scope of the
powers conferred upon Congress, and not therefore within reach of judicial power, it follows
that the case presented is not within ourjurisdiction ....
Id.
89. 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see Seeley, supra note 86, at 881.
90. See Linde, supra note 8, at 19; see also, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 1620 (1996) (invalidating a
Colorado initiative provision affecting gays/lesbians).
91. See generally Linde, supra note 8 (attacking the statewide initiative process).
92. See, e.g., id. at 40.
93. The Pacific States case, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), has been reaffirmed frequently by the United States
Supreme Court. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331
U.S. 549, 570 (1947); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,
455 (1939); Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro.
Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1917); Ohio ex
rel.Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565,569 (1916); O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244, 248 (1915); Denver v. New
York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123, 141 (1913); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256 (1913).
94. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 115 (citing Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 1), and at 123 (citing Pacific States,
223 U.S. at 118).
95. Id. at 223.
96. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184 (1992).
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97
the Court "found the claims presented to be nonjusticiable." While recognizing
that this traditional approach had recently been questioned by courts and legal
9
academics, the Court declined to address this "difficult question."
Even if the Supreme Court ultimately elects to abandon its long-held precedent
on the nonjusticiability of the guarantee clause, it does not follow that citizen
initiative amendments will be found to violate that provision. Prior to the Supreme
Court's nonjusticiability interpretation of the guarantee clause in Pacific States,
every court that had considered the issue concluded that initiative petitions did not
violate the guarantee clause. 9 The results* were certain and the reasoning
convincing. For example, in In re Pfahler,oc the California Supreme Court
concluded that the use of municipal initiatives did not violate the federal guarantee
clause. Reasoning that at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution
existing state governments were accepted into the Union as they existed, the Court
observed that four original states conducted their local government affairs under a
method of participatory democracy commonly referred to as the "New England
town government," and that, under this system, representative government was not
the norm."°1
Next, there does exist executive and legislative interpretations of the guarantee
clause that should be respected if the Court ever reconsiders the justifiability issue.
The Enabling Act of the State of Oklahoma"° was passed on June 16, 1906 by the
United States Congress. This Act required convening a convention to draft a
constitution for the new state.'0 3 The Enabling Act required that the "constitution
' 4 A subsequent section of the Act required the
shall be republican in form.'""
President of the United States to proclaim the creation of the new State of
Oklahoma if, inter alia,"the constitution and government of said proposed State are
republican in form."' 5 The Oklahoma Constitution, which Congress required to be
"republican" in form, and was so held by President Roosevelt in his Proclamation
of Statehood," ° contained provisions for citizen initiative amendments at Article V,

97. Id.
98. Id. at 185.
99. See In re Pfahler, 88 P. 270, 273 (Cal. 1906) (permitting citizens of a subdivision of a state to use
initiatives as to strictly WOAL affairs); Hopkins v. Duluth, 83 N.W. 536, 539 (Minn. 1900) (holding local
referendums do not violate the guarantee clause); Kiernan v. Portland, 111 P. 379, 381 (Or. 1910) (recognizing the
validity of local initiatives directed at local affairs); Oregon v. Pacific States Tel. & Tel., 99 P. 427, 428 (Or. 1909)
(state initiatives do not violate the guarantee clause); Kadderly v. Oregon, 74 P. 710, 719 (Or. 1903) (recognizing
the validity of state initiatives); Bonner v. Belsterling, 138 S.W. 571 (Tex. 1911) (recognizing the validity, under
the guarantee clause, of municipal initiatives).
100. 88 P. 270 (Cal. 1906).
101. See id. at 273. Some authority exists for the conclusion that municipal governments are not subject to
the guarantee clause at all. See, e.g., 16A AM. JUR. 2D, ConstitutionalLaw § 625 (1979). However, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the exercise of a municipal initiative could not be reviewed as violating the
guarantee clause, because it presented a nonjusticiable question. See Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151, 163-64
(1912). The question of whether a municipal initiative is simply not subject to guarantee clause, or whether judicial
review of the applicability of the guarantee clause is nonjusticiable, is a modem version of the chicken and egg
story.
102. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, (34 Stat. 267, Part L page 2).
103. See id.
104. Id. § 3, at 269.
105. Id. § 4, at 271.
106. See Oklahoma Convention Transcript, supra note 28, at 462 (1907). President Theodore Roosevelt's
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Section 1 " Thus, even before the Pacific States decision, both the legislative and
executive branches of the federal government believed that the initiative process
was consistent with the guarantee clause of the United States Constitution.
Moreover, if the ultimate issue is addressed without regard to justiciability, the
academics' arguments are still wanting. Basically, these arguments assert that the
guarantee clause mandates exclusive representative government in the states and
that participatory democratic devices, like the initiative and presumably town
meetings, violate its provisions."° Almost all of the academics' articles rely heavily
on the general writings of James Madison and his concerns expressed in the
FederalistPapers."°9
While Madison's observations on a republican form of government will be
specifically addressed below, a cursory review of the observations of the guarantee
clause by other founding fathers is illuminating. John Adams admitted that he never
knew what the term "republican" form of government meant, and asserted that "no
man ever did or ever will... [the reference to a republican form of government] is
so loose and indefinite that successive predominant factions will put glosses and
constructions upon it as different as light and darkness.""' Characteristically,
Thomas Jefferson understood the term "republican form of government" to mean
one that trusted the "mass of citizens ...[as] the safest depository of their own
''
rights."
Even many who argue that state initiative petitions violate the federal
constitution concede that the term "republican form of government" assured in the
guarantee clause has no precise historical meaning. As one observed: "The use of
the word 'Republican' in Article IV clearly did not have a single connotation for
those who drafted the Constitution, let alone for the far greater number who ratified
it.""' 2 However, after making this concession, the same critic then suggested that the
court should "guess" at the content of the provision, and then apply this judicial
"guess" to invalidate one of the few forms of participatory democracy available to
American citizens.'
But the document does establish a republican form, and a republican form is
what was guaranteed to the states. If we cannot ascertain exactly what the form
Statehood Proclamation expressly found: "Whereas, it appears that the said constitution and government of the
Proposed State of Oklahoma are republican in form ....Id.at 462.
107. See OKLA. CONST., art. V, § 1 (1907).
108. See id. § 512.
109. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 66, at 1539 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)); see also
Linde, supra note 8, at 23-24 (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 14,39 (James Madison)); Seeley, supra note 86,
at 905 n. 96 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)); Cynthia Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking:
Questioning the Desirabilityand Constitutionalityof Legislating by Initiative,61 S.CAL. L REV. 733, 738-39
(1988) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)). But see Oklahoma Convention Transcript, supra note
28, at 462 (establishing Oklahoma's constitution as republican in form, in spite of initiative provisions).
110. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July 20, 1807), in "Correspondence between John Adams
and Mercy Warren relating to her 'History of the American Revolution,"' Mass. Hist. Soc., 5th Ser., 4
COLLECTIONS 352, quoted in WILLIM M. WiECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTrUTION 72
(1972).
111. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 17, 23 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh, eds., Thomas Jefferson Mem'l Ass'n 1903).
112. Eule, supra, note 66, at 1541.
113. See id.
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the
ought to be, we can at least come up with an educated guess concerning
'4
goals' accountability to the majority with filters to protect minorities.
One of the most comprehensive recent analyses of the historical meaning of
"republican form of government," as understood at the time of the adoption of the
United States Constitution, appears in a law review article by Professor Deborah
Merritt." 5 In this article, Professor Merritt persuasively argues that the notes of the
actual debates in the Constitutional Convention and the subsequent ratification
debates reflect that the framers specifically viewed the clause as assigning to the
"federal government the task of rooting out monarchial tendencies and putting down
armed rebellions in the states." ' 1 6 In support of this conclusion, James Madison is
quoted as stating that the duties that the guarantee clause confers on the federal
government "are having to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial
innovations" and to suppress "domestic violence.17 Some observers have noted the
irony of using Madison's democratic political beliefs as a mean of attacking citizen
initiative petitions."'
The most intriguing aspects of Professor Merritt's analysis of the
contemporaneous history of the guarantee clause is totally ignored by initiative
critiques. Under this analysis, the guarantee clause, as originally understood, serves
not only as a check on state governments, but the federal government as well.
The language of the guarantee clause has two aspects. On the one hand, the
clause prohibits the states from adopting non-republican forms of government.
On the other hand, as long as the states adhere to republican principles, "the

114. Bonner v. Belsterig, 138 S.W. 571, 574 (Tex. 1911) cited Jefferson:
As to the meaning of the phrase, "Republican form of government" there is no better
authority than Mr. Jefferson, who, in discussing the matter, said: "Indeed, it must be
acknowledged that the term 'republic' is of very vague application in every language. Were I
to assign to this term a precise and definite idea, I would say, purely and simply, it means a
government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and not personally, according to rules
established by the majority; and that every other government is more or less republican in
proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of the
citizens.* * * On this view of the import of the term republic, instead of saying, as has been
said, that it may mean anything or nothing, we may say with truth and meaning that
governments are more or less republican as they have more or less of the element of popular
election and control in their composition; and believing, as I do, that the mass of the citizens is
the safest depository of their own rights, and especially that the evil flowing from the duperies
of the people are less injurious than those from the egotism of their agents, Iam a friend to that
composition of government which has in it the most of this ingredient."
115. See Eule, supra note 66, at 1541.
116. See Deborah Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88

CoLUM. L REV. 1 (1988).
117. See id. at 30-31.
118.
The guarantee providing for a republican form of government came about because of the
insistence of men such as Madison and Jefferson who saw in monarchy the greatest threat to the
life of the republic. "It would be strange indeed," writes one analyst, that a "guaranty made at
the insistence of the party whose leaders are still recognized as the most pronounced advocates
of democratic principles should be construed to forbid rather than to support a reform whereby
the will of the people may be made more effectual in government."
CRONIN, supra note 21, at 35.
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clauseforbids the federalgovernment from interfering with state governments
in a way that would destroy their republicancharacter."'"9

From this conceptual base, Professor Merritt argues that the guarantee clause
actually protects certain state government machinery and practices-possibly
including initiative petitions-from federal interference: 2 °
The guarantee clause, moreover, restricts the federal government's power to
interfere with the organizational structure and governmental processes chosen
by a state's residents. A republican government, as explained above, is
responsible to its voters rather than to any outside agency. In order to ensure that
state and local governments remain responsive to their constituents, those
citizens must have the power to choose the governmental forms that work best
for them. The guarantee clause, therefore, grants states control over their
internal governmental machinery. States, for example, should be free to allocate
power among the branches of state government; to create political subdivisions
and administrative agencies; to set terms of office for state officials; and to
regulate the internal affairs of governmental bodies. In addition, states should
have the power to control the procedures by which their government officials
are selected: to draw election districts, set the dates and times of local elections,
and govern other aspects of election procedure.'
An accurate reading of the guarantee clause consistent with its intent and history
does not result in a finding that state initiative petitions violate its provisions.
Rather, the guarantee clause constitutionally protects the rights of state government
to enact citizen initiatives.
4. Citizen initiative petitions undermine federal policies and should be
prohibited.
Some initiative critics assert that Congress should enact a federal law barring the
use of citizen initiative petitions at the state level. They argue that initiative
petitions have been used to enact substantive provisions inconsistent with the
critics' view of existing federal policy or their perceptions of what federal policy
should be. Thus, it has been argued that Congress, pursuant to the guarantee
clause," should enact a federal statute presuming invalid any citizen-initiated ballot
measure "that uniquely burdens a member of an identifiable group traditionally the
subject of arbitrary or invidious discrimination," or "that has been popularly enacted
to avoid the protective structures of a republican form of government."'2 The
proponent of this statute argues that Congress should "assert its power under the

119. Merritt, supra note 116, at 25 (emphasis added).

120. Professor Merritt's analysis does not directly discuss initiatives, but this conclusion is arguable using
her analysis.
121. Merritt, supra note 116, at 41 (footnotes omitted).
122. By discussing this issue, this Article does not concede that federal congressional power exists to ban
citizen initiative petitions at the state level. Rather, under the guarantee clause as discussed in Part II,it is this
author's position that the guarantee clause would actually prohibit the federal Congress from enacting such a
provision, rather than authorizing it. However, even if this interpretation is erroneous, public policy would preclude
the enactment of a federal anti-initiative statute.
123. Leong, supra note 8, at 707.
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Guarantee Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment."' 2 4 Even assuming, arguendo,
the constitutional validity of such a statute, several problems still arise. Aside from
the rather dubious expansion of federal judicial power that such a statute would
create-and the absurd subjectivity of the phrase "protective structures of a
republican form of govemment," 1 -a number of other fallacies are associated with

such a proposal.
First, the author of the proposed statute asserts that her proposal will "right the
wrongs so many have drawn attention to regarding ballot initiatives."'26 To identify
these "wrongs," the author cites circuitously 127 four guarantee clause law review
articles published over a seven-year period, at least one of which does not even
appear to deal directly with the initiative issue. Thus, apparently relying exclusively
2
on anecdotal support, the author implies that initiatives are somehow evil, ' and
Congress needs to ban some, or all of them, by a statute akin to an electoral "book
9
12

burning."

In identifying the "wrongs so many have drawn attention to,"'3 ° the cited article
mentions only three or four recent initiatives, which the article's author considers
offensive, at least one of which was an electoral failure.' While it is conceded that
initiatives, like statutes, regulations, and court decisions, can run afoul of the United
States Constitution, the record of citizen initiative petitions assumed by this article
is unsubstantiated.3 2 Sweeping statements describing citizen proposal initiatives as
124. Id. at 706. The author's rather enigmatic reference to the Fourteenth Amendment is somewhat
unsettling. At first it was assumed that an argument was being presented that Congress pursuant to Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment could prohibit the use of statewide initiatives. However, this argument, although
possibly alluded to, is .never specifically addressed. As that argument is not further addressed, it will not be
addressed further here, but will be left to a later date.
125. The amount of academic and judicial hyperbole that could gush from interpretations of the phrase
"popularly enacted to avoid the protective structures of republican form of government" makes this reader's knees
tremble with trepidation.
126. Leong, supra note 8,at 707.
127. See id. at nn.16 & 162.
128. Peter Galie & Christopher Bopst, Changing State Constitutions: Dual Constitutionalismand the
Amending Process,1 HOFSTRA LAW & POL'Y SYMP. 27, 46 (1996).
129. The moral judgment that many academics have reached concerning initiatives is perhaps best
exemplified in the following quotation describing the initiative method:
By the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, the procedure came to be identified as a
means for well financed organizations and/or groups to obtain favorable laws and as a
mechanism allowing a tyrannous majority, inflamed by prejudice or temporary hysteria, to
deprive minorities of basic rights.
Id.
130. Leong, supra note 8, at 707.
131. See id.
132. Scholars who have examined this area have found little historical support to conclude that citizen
initiative petitions present more of a threat in individual rights, than state legislatures.
Proposals to adopt direct democracy procedures have always prompted fears that the system of
checks and balances and the filtering effects of the legislative process would be bypassed,
opening up even greater possibilities for abuses of minority rights and civil liberties. Yet the
initiative and referendum record suggests that those direct democracy devices can only rarely
be faulted for impairing the rights of the powerless. Even a general comparison of the results of
ballot measures with those of legislatures reveals that although both direct and representative
lawmaking have occasionally diminished the liberties of the politically powerless, neither can
be singled out as more prone to this tendency.
Since 1900, when various direct democracy procedures were enacted in several states and
countless local governments, few measures that would have the effect of narrowing civil rights
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"Discrimination-Prone" Initiatives 33 are unsupported by fact and are pure academic
hyperbole.
Citizens initiatives are neutral. They are a mere mechanism, equally available to
citizens of liberal and conservative political persuasions. Any political interest can
attempt to place its political concerns before the electorate through using this
device."34 Throughout their history, citizen initiatives have been used by all sectors
of the political spectrum. As one student of citizen initiatives observed, they have
been historically "used almost equally by liberal environmental citizen groups and
and civil liberties have been put before the voters, and most of those have been defeated. On
those occasions when limiting or narrowing measures have been approved, there is little
evidence state legislatures would have acted differently, and some evidence state legislators or
legislatures actually encouraged the result.
CRONIN, supra note 21, at 91-92.
Even critics of the initiative who have definitionally attempted to conclude that initiatives are minority rights
restrictive, have been faced to concede that the answer is not as simple and straight forward as they previously
thought.
Does the constitutional initiative constitute a threat to civil liberties and constitutional values
as well as create constitutional confusion? In a series of articles, Janice May has addressed this
question in systematic, empirical fashion. Her findings are instructive. For the 1900-1986
period, twenty-five rights-related initiatives were adopted. Ten promoted women's rights (nine
granted the suffrage and one involved jury service); three extended criminal rights by abolishing
the death penalty and requiring a grand jury indictment and speedy trial. Two removed the poll
tax, and one extended property rights to aliens, for a total of 16 rights-extending decisions. With
regard to rights-restricting amendments, May concluded: "There is considerable evidence that,
although not numerous, more of the electorally successful constitutional initiatives have reduced
rather than expanded rights."
These include, inter alia, repeal of fair housing, anti-busing, anti-desegregation, restoration
of the death penalty, propositions limiting the rights of the accused, mandatory referendum on
fair housing, and making English the official language of the states. Contrariwise, voters
rejected a variety of rights-restricting measures, including denying rights to "subversives"; state
aid to private schools; two anti-abortion measures; repeal of ERA measures; and measures
regarding freedom of religion or expression.
The data gathered from the five year period, 1986 through 1990, also provide further support
for the conclusion that the constitutional initiative has become the most rights restrictive mode
of constitutional reform. Of the amendments adopted by all methods, 20 were restrictive and 19
rights expanding. Of the 11 constitutional initiatives adopted, 72% percent (8), were rights
restrictive, contributing disproportionately to rights reducing amendments.
The largest number of amendments, nearly half, concern crime. James M. Fischer has argued
that except for criminal justice and certain racial questions, voters either support or leave other
civil rights alone. This conclusion is supported by May:
[Tihe question of whether voters can be trusted to protect right is misguided. The desire to
narrow the rights of the accused is pervasive, reaching into the Congress, the White House and
the U.S. Supreme Court. In other words voters thus far have not been out of step with many
political leaders and judges ....
Although the record of the constitutional initiative is more positive than earlier research has
suggested, it is a fair conclusion that among the modes of constitutional reform the
constitutional initiative is-the most susceptible to misuse and demagogy. There are, however,
a variety of constraints on this procedure which have reduced the danger.
Galie, supra note 128, at 48-49 (citation omitted).
133. Debra Salz., Discrimination-Prone Initiatives and the Guarantee Clause: A Role for the Supreme Court,
62 GEo. WASH. L REv. 100, (1993).
134. One real value of initiative provisions is that they allow a diversification of political discourse, by
permitting interests which are not adequately represented by the existing two major parties to place new political
ideas before the electorate. As the two major parties exert virtual stranglehold over Congress, and state legislatures,
the traditional forums are neither open nor receptive to these new laws. Mr. Arne Leonard raises this issue during
the actual symposium. Mr. Leonard has written an exceptional article on the initiative. See Leonard, supra note
1.
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by conservatives."' 3 5 A five-year study of citizen initiatives substantiated this when
it concluded:
The results of the... study, over five years in the making, show conclusively
that initiatives-proposed... amendments placed on ballots by citizen petition
and enacted or rejected by popular vote-are truly the tools of all citizens, from
36
the ideological left to the right, from the grass roots to the corporate suites.
The political environment and the rights we enjoy in this country would be much
different if state initiatives had not been permitted under federal and state law.
Three states--Colorado, Oregon, and Arizona-approved women's suffrage at
statewide elections before the 1920 adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 7 Previously, state legislatures had rejected similar
proposals to grant women's suffrage.13 Presumably, these statewide electoral
successes advanced women's suffrage at the national level and assisted in the
ultimate adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment. Similarly, state equal rights
amendments have been approved by statewide voters in eighteen of the twenty39 The federal
seven statewide elections in which the issue has appeared.
constitutional counterpart was defeated when an insufficient number of state
legislatures ratified the proposed amendment within the time allotted by Congress.
State initiatives have been used to enhance not only women's rights but those of
other minorities as well. For example, initiatives have been used to abolish poll
taxes, establish minimum working hours, enact environmental protection measures,
campaign finance reform, and open meeting laws, provide for financial disclosure,
enhance victim rights, and reform voter registration."
Initiative critics who have urged the enactment of a federal law to prohibit state
initiatives rely heavily on overstatement, and under-substantiate their assertions.
The citizen initiative petition process is a neutral political mechanism, subject to
reasonable legislative and judicial checks and balances which nurtures the
democratic process and the education of American citizenry.
All of this reasoning dodges the real issue: What is the pragmatic political
likelihood that, even if Congress possessed the constitutional authority to ban
citizen initiative petitions under the guarantee clause, it would do so? Congressional
majorities concededly can rapidly change. Any evaluation is pure speculation,
which may change. Nonetheless, there appears little or no current support in the
federal Congress to ban statewide initiatives.
This congressional reluctance may be based on strong public support of the
citizen initiative process. 4' Presumably an electorate so predisposed would find a
congressional ban on initiatives to be prohibiting, anti-democratic, high-handed,

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

CRONN, supra note 21, at 200 (quoting David D. Schmidt, Editor of INITIATIvES NEws REPORT).
Id. at 201.
See id.
See id. at 50-51.
See id. at 199.
See id. at 199.

141. See, e.g., MAGLFBY, supra note 18, at 9 (citing a 1979 Field Institute Poll finding 85% of Californians
supportive of citizen initiatives).
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aristocratic, and elitist. 4" Arguably, in some congressional districts, supporting a
ban would be tantamount to committing political suicide. Indeed, many political
observers attributed the electoral defeat of former Speaker of the House, Thomas
Foley, to his public opposition and legal challenge to the results of the term limits
initiative enacted by the voters in his home state of Washington. 4 3
The current congressional agenda does reflect at least one proposal-by
Representative Jerry Solomon of New York-urging the adoption of a nationwide
initiative.'" Former Republican Vice Presidential candidate Jack Kemp and former
Democratic South Dakota United States Senator James Abourzek have also
previously urged similar proposals. While national initiative proposals have
appeared frequently in our history, they have previously garnered little popular
support.
On a related issue, Congress is studying revising federal judicial review of state
initiatives. In September 1995, the House of Representatives passed and referred to
the Senate a bill commonly referred to as the Bono bill 4 ' in honor of its sponsor,
the late Congressman Sonny Bono of California. " This proposal attempts to

142. One observer has also identified the inconsistencies in this strain of elitism:
All the same, we should beware of the possibility that legal scholars' nearly unanimous
distrust of direct democracy-and faith in the courts' ability to remedy any
deficiencies-evinces an unjustified and dangerous elitism. If the ordinary citizen cannot be
trusted to make the laws by which she will be governed, why should she be given the
responsibility of electing the representatives who will make those laws? Indeed, why should we
leave the important task of lawmaking to representatives elected by the masses when an
appointed bevy of Platonic Guardians is available to do the job?
Baker, supra note 62, at 776.
143. See, e.g., Laurie Kellman, Defeat of Foley Shows Backers of Term Limits It Can Be Done, WASH.
TIMES, May 2, 1995, at A6.
144. H.R. Res. 21, 105th Cong. (1997).
145. See H.R. 1170, 104th Cong. (1995).
146. The Bono bill provides as follows:
AN ACT
To provide that an application for an injunction restraining the enforcement, operation, or
execution of a State law adopted by referendum may not be granted on the ground of the
unconstitutionality of such law unless the application is heard and determined by a 3-judge
court.
Be it enacted by the State and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1.3 JUDGE COURT FOR CERTAIN INJUNCTIONS.
Any application for an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement,
operation, or execution of a State law adopted by referendum shall not be granted by a United
States district court orjudge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such State law
unless the application for the injunction is heard and determined by a court of 3 judges in
accordance with section 2284 of title 28, United States Code. Any appeal of a determination on
such application shall be to the Supreme Court. In any case to which this section applies, the
additional judges who will serve on the 3-judge court shall be designated under section
2284(b)(1) of title 28, United States Code, as soon as practicable, and the court shall expedite
the consideration of the application for an injunction.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this Act(1) the term 'State' means each of the several States and the District of Columbia;
(2) the term 'State law' means the constitution of a State, or any statute, ordinance, rule,
regulation, or other measure of a State that has the force of law, and any amendment thereto; and
(3) the term 'referendum' means the submission to popular vote of a measure passed
upon or proposed by a legislative body or by popular initiative.
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streamline federal judicial review of citizen initiatives by requiring any attempt to
enjoin the enforcement, operation, or execution of a statewide initiative to be
presented to a three-judge panel, rather than a single judge. 47 The proposal's
accompanying legislative history indicates it is intended to preclude "judgeshopping," and to expedite the federal review of statewide initiatives. This paper
proffers no opinion on the merits of this proposal, other than to infer that Congress
is exhibiting no present conduct that would suggest any current intention to prohibit
statewide initiatives by federal law.
Criticisms Concernedwith ProperAllocation of State Power Under a State
Constitution
The criticism of citizen initiatives under this category are more policy-related and
less legalistic than those under the preceding category. However, the gist of these
arguments is that the use of citizen initiatives represents a misallocation of state
power. These arguments address what provisions should, or should not, be included
in a state constitution.
B.

1. State constitutions are becoming too "statutory" and too "lengthy" as a
result of citizen initiative provisions.
Some critics argue that state constitutions are becoming too "statutory" and too
"lengthy" as a result of citizen initiative provisions. This is an intriguing argument,
which is at least partially aesthetic. The written constitution is peculiarly a creation
of American law; one need not look far in tracing its evolution. The original state
constitutions were short and were limited to the most fundamental matters. 48 These
state constitutions grew in length and complexity as American society and state
government grew. The enlargement in size and complexity of state constitutions
was undeniably attributable in part to urbanization, technological advances, and the
proliferation of governmental functions in a complex society. 49 This growth is
based on a natural evolution and development.
Based on this reality, the goal of a short, fundamental constitution is a relative
one. The primary goal must be whether the state constitution performs the functions
that the people adopting it desire it to accomplish. It is only after this primary goal
is satisfied that secondary concerns about the dimensions and appearance of a state
constitution are even relevant.
Assuming the analysis has focused on the goal of drafting a short, fundamental
state constitution, the question becomes why this is important and whether it is even
possible in a complex world. Why should a state constitution be short and limited
to fundamental matters?

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE bATE.

This Act applies to any application for an injunction that is filed on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
Id.
147. See id.
148. See P.K. Jameson & Marsha Hosack, Citizen Initiatives in Florida: An Analysis of Florida's
ConstitutionalInitiative Process, Issues, and Alternatives, 23 FLA. ST. U. L REv. 417, 420 (1995).
149. See id. at 420.
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The essence of the argument is that constitutional provisions should state only
general principles, which should have a certain degree of permanence. Statutory
provisions, on the other hand, are viewed as more transitory in nature, and subject
to frequent change. Critics charge that the use of the citizen initiative has resulted
in the inclusion of a number of provisions in state constitutions that more properly
would be "statutory" provisions under the preceding definition. No explanation has
ever been given as to why initiative petitions are more susceptible to this criticism
than amendments proposed by other means.
One of the clearest articulations of the argument appears in Advisory Opinion to
the Attorney General-LimitedMarine Net Fishing." The Florida Supreme Court
concluded that i proposed constitutional amendment banning gill-net fishing in
Florida satisfied all requirements for inclusion on the ballot.' While joining in this
conclusion, Justice Parker Lee McDonald, in a concurring opinion, questioned the
wisdom of including such matter in the state constitution:
I concur with the majority that the proposed amendment complies with the
constitutional and statutory requirements. The merit of the proposed amendment
is to be decided by the voters of Florida and this Court's opinion regarding the
wisdom of any proposed amendment is irrelevant to its legal validity. I am
concerned, however, that the net fishing amendment is more appropriate for
inclusion in Florida's statute books than in the state constitution.
The legal principles in the state constitution inherently command a higher
status than any other legal rules in our society. By transcending time and
changing political mores, the constitution is a document that provides stability
in the law and society's consensus on general, fundamental values. Statutory
law, on the other hand, provides a set of legal rules that are specific, easily
amended, and adaptable to the political, economic, and social changes of our
society."5
Justice McDonald then suggested that the permanency of the Florida Constitution
was threatened by the proliferation of amendments. 5 He observed that the Florida
Constitution had been amended forty-one times between 1968-1984, at a rate of 2.4
amendments per year.' 5 4 He then suggested that a Constitutional Revision
Commission address the problem of frequent amendments and initiatives,
55
apparently linking his concern with ease of amendment to the use of initiatives.
In the following year, Justice Stephen H. Grimes of the Florida Supreme Court
joined the now growing anti-initiative chorus. While dissenting from the court's
opinion to strike a citizen initiative petition from the ballot, Grimes still observed:
"I personally believe that constitutional amendment by initiatives is being overused
.... 56 This appeared to be a reference to the constitutional/statutory argument
raised earlier by McDonald. While both McDonald and Grimes voted in support of
150. See 620 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1993).
151. See id. at 999.
152. Id. at 999-1000 (McDonald, J., concurring).

153. See id.at 1000.
154.

See id. at 1000 n.2.

155. See id. at 1000.
156. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Re: Stop Early Release of Prisoners, 642 So. 2d 724, 728
(Fla. 1994) (Grimes, C. J., dissenting).
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the validity of the initiatives before them, both statements contain a disturbing
nonjudicial tone which suggests the preelection review of initiative petitions in
Florida may be less objective than one would hope.
A 1986 study of approved and proposed Florida constitutional amendments
supported Justice McDonald's overall conclusion that the Florida Constitution has
been easy to amend. 157 However, the same study refuted the assertion that the ease
of amendment is attributable to citizen initiative petitions." 8 According to the study,
the Florida Constitution had at that time been amended thirty-nine times. 59 Only
one of the successful amendments was by citizen initiative; the remaining thirtyeight were by legislative proposal.' 6°
One author of the study updated its finding in 1995 when the pace of initiative
petitions had increased. 61 This updated study concluded that there was no
immediate need to place any limits on initiative petitions." The vast majority of the
Florida ballot had been attributable to
proposed amendments clogging 6the
3
legislative, not citizen, proposals.
The preceding discussion reflects a disturbing truth about criticisms of citizen
initiative petitions. Initiatives are frequently attacked for creating problems which
a review of the actual facts readily disputes. One senses an almost irrational distrust
and hostility toward initiatives where judges, politicians, and many academics are
involved.
While placing the frequency of amendment argument in proper factual
perspective, the same Florida study then proposed a rule that all proposed
constitutional amendments be subject to a requirement that its subject matter be
"constitutional" in scope rather than "statutory.""' The author of the rule readily
conceded that the proposed rule would interfere with the electorate's right to
discipline nonresponsive legislatures, 65 but presumably believed that concerns

157. See Joseph W. Little & Julius Medenblik, Restricting LegislativeAmendments to the Constitution, 80
RA. B.J. 43 (1986).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See Joseph W. Little, Does Direct Democracy Threaten ConstitutionalGovernance in Florida?,24
STETSON L. REV. 393 (1995).
162. See id. at 413.
163. See id. at 408.
164. Little stated:
This rule would secure the constitution its rightful status as the basic defining and powerlimiting instrument under which state government functions. Under this rule, every amendment

to the constitution would either change the definition of the constitutional structure of
government or change the limits on governmental power. Every amendment proposed, whether
by the legislature, a commission, or people's initiative, should be tested against this standard
before being permitted on the ballot.
Id. at 410.
165. Specifically, the author asserted:

Some may criticize this proposal as depriving the people of an established means of "going
over the head of the legislature" in order to constitutionalize laws or programs that the
legislature declines to enact. Similarly, defenders of the legislature may complain that the
measure would deprive the legislature of the power to let the people decide whether to adopt
laws or programs upon which the population is deeply divided.
lIdat 410-11.
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about the alleged misuse of the constitution through the inclusion of "statutory"
materials outweighed any participatory democracy concerns.
A closer analysis of the constitutional/statutory criticism suggests that this
argument can be and has been overstated. As a young Assistant Attorney General
for the State of Oklahoma, I was surprised when first encountering the 1907
provision of the Oklahoma Constitution that establishes the flash point and specific
gravity of kerosene.'" When this provision-which at the time seemed misplaced
in the constitution-was brought to the attention of the then Attorney General, he
merely looked puzzled and responded, "Well, it hasn't changed any since then, has

it?"
The Oklahoma Constitution of 1907 has frequently been criticized as too lengthy
and too statutory. 67 This criticism is a longstanding one, which the Oklahoma
electorate has repeatedly rejected by refusing to substantially revise or amend its
constitution.
In 1947, the Oklahoma legislature authorized a study of the Oklahoma
Constitution, contemplating revisions to it.168 Pursuant to this authorization, a

citizen advisory committee examined the Oklahoma Constitution and issued a report
in 1950.169 Several issues confronted by the committee were criticisms of the
lengthy, "statutory" provisions contained in the Oklahoma Constitution.
The committee addressed these concerns in the first chapter of the study entitled
"What a Constitution Should Contain."' 170 This chapter is subdivided into three
subsections, two of which are directly relevant to our inquiry. 7 The first subsection
inquires why state constitutions are longer than they previously have been. The
primary response given is that the electorate has simply lost confidence in the
166. Article XX, section 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides:
Until changed by the Legislature, the flash test provided for under the laws of Oklahoma
Territory for all kerosene oil for illuminating purposes shall be 115 degrees Fahrenheit; and the
specific gravity test for all such oil shall be 40 degrees Baume.
OKLA. CONST. art XX, § 2.
167. See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government and Popular Distrust: The
Obstruction/FacilitationConundrum RegardingState ConstitutionalAmendment by InitiativePetition, 17 OKLA.
CrrY U. L.REV. 3 (1992). This article states:
While I make no claim to having exhaustively researched each of the other forty-nine state
constitutions, I feel confident in asserting that Oklahoma's must be among the worst. It is the
third-longest state constitution, more then ten times as lengthy as Vermont's (and the United
States'). Article IX of the Oklahoma Constitution (creating the Corporation Commission) is
almost twice as long as the Constitution of the United States (excluding the amendments);
section 13 of Article IX, which creates fifty-one exceptions to the rule prohibiting railroads from
offering free passes, is more lengthy than Article il of the United States Constitution ....
But size alone does not badness make. The constitution's weight, to be sure, would
contribute to a reasonable suspicion of surplusage. That suspicion, in turn, would be confirmed
by the discovery of provisions specifically authorizing the legislature to pass laws which the
legislature is already generally authorized to pass, specifically authorizing the citizenry, through
initiative petition, to enact laws which the citizenry is already generally authorized to enact, and
exhorting-in non-self-executing provisions-the legislature to pass certain laws.
Id. at 67-68 (citations omitted).
168. See S. Res. 17, 1947 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. (West).
169. See H. V. THORNTON, OKLAHOMA CONSTrMT ONAL STUDIES OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTrrU1rONAL
SURVEY AND CrrZEN ADVISORY COMMlrEE (1950).
170. See id. The three subsections to this chapter are: I) Why Constitutions Are Long; 2) Why Long
Constitutions Are Objectionable; and 3) Framework of Government.
171. See id.
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legislature. "State constitutions have grown longer because legislatures have often
failed to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the public."'7 2 In response to real or
perceived abuse, the electorate has placed constitutional restrictions on the
legislature's traditional prerogatives through constitutional provisions creating
bureaus and commissions, and restricting traditional legislative functions such as
imposing taxes, creating public debt, and spending public funds. All of this has
increased the length and complexity of state constitutions. The electorate has also
used the initiative to propose constitutional amendments that "afford the legal
voters an opportunity to submit amendments when the legislature, either out of
wisdom, indifference or even corruption, refuses to do so."'
The second explanation given for lengthy, complex constitutions in the advisory
committee's report is "Judicial Opposition to Social Policy."' 7 4 This argument
concludes that some activist state courts had used principles of natural law and
general provisions of the state constitution to invalidate progressive social policy.
To rein in an activist judiciary, several state constitutions ensconced specific
provisions that might otherwise be considered "statutory" provisions into the state
constitutions. For example, the Oklahoma Constitution prescribes an eight-hour
workday for public employees, 75 prohibits women and children from working
underground, 76 and requires the legislature to enact laws to protect the health and
safety of industrial employees.' 77 These "statutory" provisions were added to restrict
7
the ability of an activist judiciary to invalidate progressive social legislature. 1
While the presence of such provisions in the state constitution might offend the
sensibilities of academic constitutional purists, they did solve the problem they were
aimed at, and otherwise vulnerable members of Oklahoma's workforce were
protected from economic exploitation by their employers.
In a perfect world a state constitution may in fact be brief and limited exclusively
to fundamental matters. However, we live in far from a perfect world. Our world is
urban, technologically-advanced, and complex. Our political history reveals periods
of unresponsive legislatures and renegade judges. In the world in which we do live,
a lengthy, complex state constitution is the price, albeit a small price, we pay for
responsive government.
Are current state constitutions too lengthy or too "statutory"? No, they are as
lengthy and as statutoiy as they need to be to accomplish the societal purposes
desired by the majority of the electorate that adopted them. Perhaps Thomas
Jefferson saw this point best when he balanced concerns for constitutional
permanence with the realities of modem life:
I am certainly not an advocate of frequent and untried changes in laws and
constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with because,

172. Id.
at 1.
173. Id.
at 19.
174. See id.
at2.
175. OKLA. CONST. art. XXII, § 1.

176. See id.
at§ 4.
177. See id. at § 5.
178. See THORNTON, supra note 169, at 2.
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when once known, we can accommodate ourselves to them and find practical
means of correcting them.
But I know also that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners
and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must
advance also, and keep pace with the times.'79
2. Initiative provisions undermine the aims of representative government.
The objections covered by this category have long been articulated. An early
critic of citizen initiatives was William Howard Taft. In 1913, the corpulent former
Republican President criticized initiatives, referendums, and recall provisions. 8 '
Characterizing the proponents of the participatory democracy devices as
"cranks,''. Taft attacked the devices, asserting they necessarily weakened the will
of the legislature by depriving it of its courage and independence of action, and by
holding it up as unworthy of public confidence.' At about the same time, a
Republican Senator from Utah, George Sutherland, who later became one of the
more conservative justices in United States Supreme Court history, also attacked the
initiative process as destructive of the legislative deliberative process.'83
With all appropriate respect to these important figures in our legal history, their
arguments were unconvincing when made and certainly have not improved with
age. Taft's argument is an incredibly patronizing one in which elected officials are
treated as hypersensitive and totally lacking in self-confidence and personal
conviction. Presumably, the mere existence of judicial review would also propel
them into an inactive comatose state. Legislators as hypersensitive as Taft
hypothesizes would better be served by seeking employment in a less public
occupation.
Justice Sutherland's criticism, however, contains a grain of truth, which he never
fully explored. Sutherland feared that the use of the initiative would result in
decisions being made in the privacy of voting booths, without the public debates,
accommodations, and compromises of the legislative process.8 4 What Sutherland
neglected to address was the political discourse that an initiative election can, and
generally does, trigger. Initiatives frequently trigger political participation by those
citizens not normally involved in representative government. "I While it may qualify

179. See also Speech of President Pro Tempre J.F. King to the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention,
Oklahoma Convention Transcript, supra note 28, at 7-12.
180. See WnliAM HowARD TAFT, POPULAR GOvERNMENT (1913).
181. See id. at 54. Taft's use of the term "cranks" is puzzling. WEBSTER'S NEw TWENTIETH CENTURY
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (20th. ed. 1969), defines a "crank" as "an irritable complaining person," and a person
who has odd stubborn notions about something; eccentric." See id at 425. Since an initiative can only become law
if a majority of voters approve, Taft inexplicably seems to be characterizing the majority of the American electorate
as cranks. His attitude toward the electorate may explain, in part, his failure to be re-elected President in 1912.
182. See TAFT, supra note 180, at 63-64.
183. HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND RESTORING AJURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL
RIGHTS 15-16 (1994).
184. Id.
185. See Leonard,supra note 1, at 1216-27.
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as "Geek-Speak," at least one observer has
touted the initiative
process as
18 7
86
contributing to the "alienation amelioration"' of our citizenry.
Sutherland's observations do raise, indirectly, a recurring concern about
initiatives. Many observers have noted that the legislative process involves public
hearings, evaluation of testimony, reflection, deliberation, and compromise.'
While not all observers find this process a totally commendable one,"s9 and other
observers have viewed these "benefits" as being substantially embellished,"9°
some 91 deliberative process does exist in the drafting of legislative proposals that
is not available for initiative petitions.

186. Arrow, supra note 167, at 49.
187. See id Moreover, the initiative process contributes to alienation amelioration: the very act of signaturesolicitation conveys a message to the citizenry (whether sympathetic or unsympathetic to the particular petition in
question) that individuals can directly affect the operation of their governments. At the campaign stage, large
numbers of individuals (many of whom doubtless have never been similarly involved) participate in various ways.
Even apart from the ancillary education-for-citizenship benefit, such involvement cannot but enhance the quality
of citizen participation in self-government, both as perceived and as a matter of fact. See id.
188. See id.
189. One is reminded of the aphorism frequently attributed to Otto Van Bismarck that "no man should see
how laws or sausage are made .... THOMAS C. MARKS & JOHN F. COOPER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A
NUTSHE1, 107 (1988) (quoting Otto Van Bismarck).
190. Arrow, supra note 167, at 49-59; see also Briffault, supra note 62, at 1362-63, where the following
criticisms are made of the legislative deliberative process:
Magleby's claims about the deliberative nature of the legislative process seem more
plausible on the surface, but they, too, are overstated. Legislators are expert specialists in
lawmaking, equipped with staffs and resources that help them reach informed decisions. They
work through a process of hearings, amendments, revisions, and debates that promotes reasoned
consideration of a bill. In short, as Magleby contends, the legislative process is designed to
foster deliberation.
But, of course, the potential for deliberation does not ensure that deliberation always
occurs. In fact, much legislation is enacted without the informed, thoughtful analysis or
extensive consideration contemplated by the legislative ideal. Many state legislatures act on a
significant number of their bills in marathon sittings at the end of the legislative session.
According to one commentator, 'The crush of end-of-session business... buries state legislators
In many states it becomes impossible even to find bills.' In one session
in the closing weeks ....
of the New York Legislature, for example, 508 bills were passed in the last three days the
legislature met.
Lack of deliberation is not reserved for the end of the session. One California state senator
entitled his political memoirs What Makes You Think We Read the Bills? and proceeded to
explain: Legislators consistently vote on legislation without understanding what is in it,
especially when the final vote is taken. Every legislator has his own system for judging how he
will vote, but reading the bill usually isn't part of the procedure, and listening to debate on the
bill's merits certainly isn't either.
Rather, most legislators usually abide by the decision of a party caucus, follow the lead of
influential members, or defer to the recommendations of lobbyists and interest groups. That
the legislative process has a greater potential for deliberative decision making than does
initiative voting is likely, but Magleby has simply posited the case for the legislature's greater
rationality; he certainly has not proven it.
Briffault, supra note 62, at 1362-63 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
191. Some observers question whether a legislative body, like Congress, is capable of considering
constitutional issues. Judge Abner Mikva, a former Congressman himself, has argued that "institutionally and
politically, Congress is designed to pass over the constitutional questions .... Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does
Congress Support and Define the Constitution?,61 N.C. L. REv. 587, 609 (1983). Mikva also observed that "for
the most part the legislators are motivated by a desire to enact any particular piece of legislation that fills the
perceived needs of the moment." Id. at 606.
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Analysts speak of the "filtering effects of the legislative process" available in the
legislature, which is absent in the initiative process."9 A recent controversial federal
appellate court decision struck down an initiative approved by the California
electorate almost a decade prior.'93 In its ruling the court noted: "Before an initiative
becomes law, no committee meetings are held .... No legislative analysts study the
law; no floor debates occur... and it is far more difficult to 'reconvene' to amend
or clarify the law if a court interprets it contrary to the voter's intent."'' 94 This
opinion was identified as one that exhibited "growing concern in the initiative
195
process... being used more and more to address major issues of policy."'
Some of this criticism is clearly exaggerated. While no "official" or "legislative
history" exists for citizen initiative petitions, there is often a considerable unofficial
history in campaign literature published by the state and the political parties, as well
as extensive media coverage."9 This publicity frequently exceeds the publicity and
history accompanying legislative proposals. Further, the scope and extent of
committee reports, hearings, and debates accompanying a non-initiative proposed
constitution amendment vary from state to state and often are very limited. 9 7 In
regard to deliberation and debate, the election itself provides an opportunity for the
people to become involved in this process without being frustrated by stacked
legislature committee assignments, arcane rules of procedure, and legislative
privilege and arrogance. The existence of a committee system and public debate did
little to further William Weld's chances of becoming the United States Ambassador
to Mexico, once the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator
Jesse Helms, decided that he did not want Weld's nomination considered. 9 ' Nor is
this example isolated. There are a number of instances in which the legislative
process has been intentionally used to mislead and confuse the issues being
presented to the electorate. 99
Nonetheless, the citizen initiative process, as currently administered in most
states, is susceptible to criticism, particularly when the initiative attempts to address
very technical and complex matters. As our society has become more complex, so

192. See CRONIN, supranote 21, at 92.
193. Since this opinion was issued on October 7, 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has asked the
parties whether the issues in the case should be heard by the court en banc. Larger 9th Circuit Panel May Rehear
Term Limits Case, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Oct. 20, 1997, at Al. One proponent of the initiative that was
overturned by a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals speculated why the court acted in such an
unprecedented fashion:
"It is our sense that the term limit decision by Justice Reinhardt may have been sufficiently
embarrassing to the other jurists on the 9th Circuit that they want to pre-empt another reversal
by the U.S. Supreme Court," said Uhler. "After all, Judge Reinhardt's last 11 opinions have
been overturned by the court."
Id. See also David G. Savage, Getting the High Court's Attention -Liberal Learning 9th Circuit Is Often
Reversed, 83-Nov. A.B.A. J., 46 (1997).
194. Henry Weinstein, Novel Decision With Broad Impact, LA. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1997, (Metro Desk Section)
atAI6.
195. Id.
196. See Marks, supra note 36, at 1261.
197. See id.
198. Letters to the Editor, USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 1997 at 20A.
199. See, e.g., Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982); Grose v. Firestone, 422 So. 2d 303 (Fla.
1982); Thomas C. Marks, The Case ofthe Bogus Ballot Summary: Grose v. Firestone, 5 ST. THOMAS L REV. 147
(1992).
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have our constitutions, laws, and regulations. In recent years, after enacting major
legislations, it has been commonplace for legislatures to enact "Reviser," or
"Technical Correction Bills," to correct inadvertent errors in the original legislation.
While this approach works reasonably well for legislative enactments, constitutional
errors are not as easily rectified. Thus, when the electorate adopts an initiative
amendment that contains inadvertent, but obvious errors, there is little remedy short
of radical judicial reconstruction or subsequent amendment to address the flaw.
Some have suggested that if citizen initiative petitions proceeded through a drafting
process akin to the legislative process, such flaws would be remedied prior to any
election on the question. This suggestion, as well as others, will be considered in
the next section.
C.

Criticism of the Manner by Which Citizen Initiative PetitionsAre Currently
Administered

1. Impact of special interests and paid petition gatherers.
The number of criticisms of citizen initiative petitions has escalated within the
last few years. The criticisms that are most disturbing are those relating to the actual
administration of these petitions.
The original proponents of the citizen initiative petition saw it as a way for the
common people to bypass corrupt legislators and activist judges, and to provide a
means of enacting the constitutional provisions most responsive to their collective
concerns. To insure that the process was not misused, the drafters of the provisions
intentionally made it difficult for proposals to reach the ballot. This difficulty was
accomplished by imposing substantial signature requirements to insure a
proposition had fairly broad support before it was placed on the ballot. These
signature requirements range from three to fifteen percent of the voting electorates,
calculated from a measuring election, usually a recent statewide election such as a
gubernatorial race.2
Although never imposed as an explicit requirement, the original sponsors of the
initiative process apparently contemplated that signatures would be gathered by
armies of volunteers committed to the cause of the petition. To a limited extent, the
original sponsors' vision has occurred. The signatures on the "Ethics in
Government" Amendment to the Florida Constitution were gathered exclusively by
unpaid volunteers."' Until the 1970s, the signatures for most California initiatives
were obtained by unpaid volunteers.' However, in large part because of a decision
of the United States Supreme Court, the original sponsors' vision of armies of
unpaid signature-gatherers moving door-to-door in pursuit of their political goals
has been replaced by a business fueled by capitalism and compensated in cash
rather than political satisfaction.

200. See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
202. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein & Robert M. Stem, The First Amendment and Paid Initiative Petition
Circulators: A Dissenting View and a Proposal, 17 HASrINGS CONST. LQ. 175, 220 (1989).
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Colorado enacted a statute making it a felony to pay individuals to circulate
initiative petitions. 2 3 In 1988, the United States Supreme Court invalidated this
statute, asserting it represented an unconstitutional infringement on the First
Amendment rights of the paid signature gatherers. 2°4 In its holding, the Court
specifically rejected Colorado's argument that the statute was essential to protect
the integrity of the initiative process. 'The State's interest in protecting the integrity
of the initiative process does not justify the prohibition because the State has failed
to demonstrate that it is necessary to burden appellees' ability to communicate their
message in order to meet its concerns."2 5
The Court's use of the First Amendment to protect paid petition circulators has
not gone uncriticized, ° and the Meyers decision has been described as removing
from "consideration by the states ...a salutary and timely device for the reform of
the initiative process."' Although not all initiative states had similar bans at the
time of the Meyers decision, and the "initiative industry"20' had grown to different
levels of maturity in the various states, the Meyers decision had a tremendous
negative impact on initiative reform attempts.' With the imprimatur of the United
States Supreme Court, the "initiative industry" took center stage in the initiative
debate. Representatives of "initiative industries" openly were quoted as stating that
"if you have enough money, you can get on the ballot. Yeah, no question. 2 0
An article in the Los Angeles Times articulated the concerns of many over the
impact that well-funded special interest groups were having on initiative petitions:
It is not just the number of initiatives nor the complexity that is prompting
concern. It is that the system seems to have slipped away from the citizens it was
invented to serve into the hands of the very kind of wealthy special interests it
was meant to contain.
Merely qualifying a measure for the ballot can cost as much as $700,000 and
consume more time than most citizen groups can muster. Taking their place is
a whole new industry of consultants, professional petition circulators, pollsters
and media gurus who have been lured away from traditional campaigns by
special interests willing to spend whatever it takes to promote or fend off these
measures.211

Not all initiative observers believe that the initiative process has been totally
captured by the economic special interests that it was originally created to

203. COL REv. STAT. § 1-40-110 (1980).

204. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
205. Id. at 426.
206. See Lowenstein & Stem. supra note 202.

207. Id. at 176.
208. The term "initiative industry" applies to businesses that receive compensation to gather signatures for
citizen petitions and was apparently coined by David Magleby. See MAGIEBY, supra note 18, at59.
209. One post-Meyer approach to deal with this problem is found in N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-12 (Supp.
1989). In that statute, the North Dakota legislature banned payments to initiative petition circulators that were
calculated on a per signature basis, but not the payment of salaries to circulators. See id. It is unclear whether this
statute would survive a constitutional challenge. However, it really does not address the basic problem presented.
210. Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 202, at 175 n. 1(quoting Mike Amo of American Petition Consultants
on May 8, 1989).
211. Leo C. Wolensky, Are Citizens Losing the Initiative?, LA. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1988, § I at 1, col 5.
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control. 2 ' Regardless, the sponsoring of initiative petitions by economic interests,
and the use of their financial resources to obtain the signatures necessary to qualify
a question for ballot inclusion, undoubtedly have eroded confidence in the process.
While the evidence is unclear whether the practices are isolated or representative,
"horror stories" concerning the involvement of special economic interests in state
initiatives commonly are reported. The National Rifle Association allegedly
invested $6,000,000 in a Maryland gun control referendum, and the tobacco
industry has also been reported to have invested $21,000,000 in a losing campaign
opposing an increase in California's tobacco tax.21 3 The same source estimated that,
in 1992, over $17,000,000 was spent on initiative measures in twenty-one states. 1 4
In the 1996 general election in Florida, an initiative proposal to impose a tax on
sugar to fund the environmental cleanup of the Everglades attracted $35,000,000
in campaign spending by both sides.215
However, concerns over the impact of special interests and their financial
resources no more call for the abolition of the initiative than evidence of legislative
corruption calls for abolition of the legislature. While concerns over special interest
groups and their resources erode confidence in the initiative, these same forces also
erode confidence in the integrity of our legislators.
Private wealth and special interests dominate the financing of candidate
elections as well as initiative petition drives and ballot proposition campaigns.
Inequalities of wealth and organization influence both the outcome of elections
and the post-election behavior of legislators. Indeed, heavy affi'rmative spending
seems to be even more effective in candidate elections than in initiative
balloting. More significantly, campaign contributions influence the conduct of
government. A legislator comes to represent a financial constituency in addition
to his geographic constituency, so that campaign contributions provide access
to the legislative agenda. Although voter turnout may be slightly lower in
initiative contests than in candidate elections, the number of Americans who
influence the political arena through financial contributions is much more
limited. That group-like the initiative electorate-is composed
disproportionately of persons of above-average income and education .... The
problems of wealth and organizational limits on access are common to both
direct and representative government; Magleby certainly makes no showing that
by campaign finance and special interest
the legislative process is less skewed
16
lobbying than is direct democracy.
What, then, is the solution to the negative impact of special economic interests
and their financial resources on legislatures and the initiative process? In regard to
the initiative process, a number of interesting proposals have been suggested.2 17

212. See, e.g., ScmiDr, supra note 33, at 35-36 (presenting empirical evidence to dispute this conclusion).
213. See MAGLEBY, supra note 18, at 30.
214. Id.

215. Without doubt, the pervasive presence of "for profit" businesses, acting as guns-for-hire in offering to
place initiative questions on the ballot and using paid signature gatherers to do so, is in the author's opinion
unseeming to the democratic initiative process and has eroded confidence in it.
216. Briffault, supra note 62, at 1361-62 (citation omitted).
217. In preparation for the 1997 Constitutional Revision Commission, a number of potential reforms have
been identified for the Commission. The citation in this Article should not be construed as agreement with all, or
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This Article will discuss a few that attempt to counter the impact of special interest
money.
The first recommendation is simply disclosure. The problem confronted is dual.
On the one hand, there is concern over special economic interests funding or
sponsoring, directly or indirectly, citizen initiative petitions. The states can
constitutionally require such information to be reported to a state agency without
interfering with the First Amendment rights of such entities. The sponsorship and
funding of citizen initiative petitions can then be exposed to public inspection
through its release to the media. The publicizing of such information, particularly
the extent of financial support, will then regularly become part of the political
discourse accompanying the initiative campaign. Thus, the voters can intelligently
factor this information into their decisionmaking process.
The second part of this problem involves the payment of signature gatherers, and
the compensation paid to businesses in the "initiative industry" for coordinating and
conducting the signature-gathering process. In the wake of Meyers, it is
constitutionally questionable whether a state can criminalize the payment of
compensation for gathering signatures. 218 However, nothing in that decision would
appear to preclude paid signature gatherers from being required to disclose that fact
and the amount of such compensation to a regulatory state agency, or to those from
whom they solicit signatures. Until fairly recently, I have always assumed that
signature gatherers for citizen petitions were gathering signatures solely out of their
any proposals.
The Constitution Revision Commission should, in its hearings, explore in depth ways that
direct democracy can be improved, particularly with respect to making it a more deliberative
process. The following paragraphs are intended merely to illustrate some of the many issues
which can and should be raised.
To combat one-sided arguments and the potential for improper voter influence caused by
special interest group paid advertising, the commission should consider placing a limit on
campaign spending and require that all paid advertisements include the names of the main
contributors. This would enable the public to know who is sponsoring an issue, associate the
argument with the sponsor, discover hidden agendas, determine the credibility of the argument,
and help voters better understand the initiative they are to vote on.
As a way to provide for more balanced debates, initiative sponsors could be required to
conduct public hearings, or there should be a provision requiring government-sponsored public
hearings on ballot initiatives. While we would prefer that public financing be implemented for
educating the public and the use of private funds be proscribed, we recognize that citizens often
disapprove such use of public monies, so that a combination of the two may be necessary to
ensure public awareness of an issue.
Another issue to be considered is a provision permitting revision or amendment to initiatives
qualified for the ballot. One possibility would be to permit alternations following the public
hearings. The hearings would help identify drafting problems, constitutionality issues, and
voters' concerns, and the sponsor, in response, would modify or refine the initiative. Such a
provision would provide the voters with more access to and input in the initiative process-what
direct democracy was intended to do.
A second possibility would be to implement the indirect statutory initiative process. This
would permit the legislature to act on the imitative prior to its placement on the ballot. The
legislature would conduct hearings on the initiative, and could adopt the proposal, refine it, or
offer an alternative proposal to be placed on the ballot along with the initiative. This method
would alleviate the fears of those who believe that the direct initiative process does not provide
the degree of debate and analysis necessary prior to implementing public policies.
John B. Anderson & Nancy C. Ciampa, Ballot Initiatives:Recommendationsfor Change, 71 FLA. B.J. 71, 73-74

(1997).
218. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 414.
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personal commitment to their cause. Presumably, many undecided voters, who
might be unfamiliar with the specifics of a particular petition, might be favorably
inclined to let the matter be placed on a statewide ballot, as a result of the apparent
political commitment of the signature-gatherers. The same voters might feel
differently if they realized the signature-gatherers were driven by a desire for
compensation. 19Nonetheless, such requirements might aid in reforming the process
without intruding unnecessarily into its operation.
Another proposal involves a somewhat complicated "two-tier signature"
requirement."' Under this proposal, signatures obtained by politically motivated
volunteers and compensated professional petition circulators would both be
considered, but volunteer gathered signatures would ultimately count more towards
the final number of required signatures than signatures gathered by paid
circulators."' If this proposal were adopted, a petition drive relying exclusively on
volunteers would require fewer overall signatures to be placed on the ballot than
one relying on paid signature gathers.222 Although such an approach would clearly
complicate the governmental responsibilities of verifying petitions, the additional
burden on government might be justified by a necessary reform of the system.
2. Ambiguities, errors, and omissions in drafting citizen initiative petitions
and ballot clutter.
Another common criticism that has been directed at citizen initiative petitions is
that there are too many of them and that they are too technical, too lengthy, too
misleading, too confusing, contradictory, inflexible, and poorly drafted.223
Sometimes these latter criticisms are directed exclusively at the ballot title and
summary; sometimes the same criticisms have been made of the substantive
provisions of the initiative petitions themselves. Frequently, the absence of
legislative-type committee hearings, public testimony, debates, and deliberations in
the preparation of the provision is blamed for this alleged shortcoming.224
This has proven a difficult problem to remedy. Although the problem has been
frequently identified and many solutions proposed,22 5 few concrete proposals have
been adopted in the various states with initiative provisions. Part of the explanation
for the lack of any reforms has probably been concern over anticipated electoral
hostility, should the legislature begin to tinker with a power historically reserved to
the people.
One proposal to deal with voter confusion attributable to the presence of multiple
initiative petitions at a particular election is almost startling in its simplicity.226
Although the original proposal being referenced was directed at amendments
proposed by a legislature, the same concept might be adopted and workable in an

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

But see Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 202, at 220.
See id. at 221.
See id.
See id.
See Vlae Kershner, Big Changes Urged in Law on Initiatives, S.F. CHRON., April 15, 1992 at A13.
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
See Little, supra note 161, at 408.
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initiative setting. Basically, this proposal would limit the number of initiative
petitions that can be presented to the electorate in any given general election to an
arbitrary number, such as three. 7 Illinois has essentially adopted this approach by
imposing a quota of three initiatives per election, on a first come, first served
basis.22 Petitions qualified but unable to be placed on the ballot because of the
numerical limitation would be placed on the ballot of the next general election
based on their date of qualification.2 2 a
A numerical limit would create a barrier and otherwise interfere to a limited
extent with the electorate's right of initiative. The extent of this interference would
be determined primarily by the current level of frustration the voters felt toward
their state government. Conceivably, the number of allowable petitions in a general
election ought to be more or less than three. Although any impairment of the
people's right to use of the initiative is unsettling, a numerical restriction of
allowable questions might be a worthwhile reform to consider. Although it may
interfere slightly with the use of the initiative, it can be justified as an attempt to
maximize the quality of the political discourse during a particular election by
limiting the number of issues presented to the voters to a manageable number that
can be studied and debated. It would also give citizens an additional reason not to
sign petitions.
In the voting booth, the voter is confronted with the title and ballot summary of
a particular proposal. In many instances, the voter may not have read the substantive
provisions included in the petition itself. Thus, the quality and clarity of the ballot
title and summary can play an important role in the election. In some states, the
proponents of the petition prepare the proposed ballot title and summary. 2 0 Even
assuming a title drafted in this fashion survives pre-election judicial review, the lack
of uniformity in drafting styles from question to question may tend to confuse

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-1 (West 1993).
See lttle, supra note 161, at 408.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.161 (West 1995). This statute provides:

(1) Whenever a constitutional amendment or other public measure is submitted to the vote
of the people, the substance of such amendment or other public measure shall be printed in clear
and unambiguous language on the ballot after the list of candidates, followed by the word "yes"
and also by the word "no," and shall be styled in such a manner that a "yes" vote will indicate
approval of the proposal and "no" vote will indicate rejection. The wording of the substance of
the amendment or other public measure and the ballot title to appear on the ballot shall be
embodied in the joint resolution, constitutional revision commission proposal, constitutional
convention proposal, taxation and budget reform, commission proposal, or enabling resolution
or ordinance. The substance of the amendment or other public measure shall be an explanatory
statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure. The ballot title
shall consist of a caption, not exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly
referred to or spoken of.
(2) The substance and ballottitle ofa constitutionalamendment proposed by initiativeshall
be prepared by the sponsor and approved by the Secretary of State in accordance with rules
adoptedpursuant to s.120.54. The Department of State shall give each proposed constitutional

amendment a designating number for convenient reference. This number designation shall
appear on the ballot. Designating numbers shall be assigned in the order of filing or certification
of the amendments. The Department of State shall furnish the designating number, the ballot
title, and the substance of each amendment to the supervisor of elections of each county in
which such amendment is to be voted on.
Id. (emphasis added).
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voters. Some states have attempted to address this concern by involving various
state officials in drafting the ballot title and summary.
California, for example, imposes an obligation on its Attorney General to prepare
" ' By
the ballot summary presented to the electorate describing initiative petitions.23
focusing the responsibility for this function in one state office, the concern for
uniform drafting of ballot summaries would appear to be solved. The cost of solving
this problem is to deprive the sponsors of participation in the drafting process.
While the objectivity of an independent state drafter might overcome this concern,
it does create other problems.
Oklahoma, for example, relocated the ballot summary drafting responsibility
from its Attorney General's office to the Secretary of State as assisted by the
Superintendent of Public Instruction. 2 Although the Oklahoma legislature has been
the target of many jokes concerning its solution, which requires all ballot summaries
to be prepared at an eighth grade reading level,233 the legislature was presumably
motivated by a desire to improve the quality of the communication of the content
of initiative petitions. 2
Arkansas has opted for a compromise approach on the drafting of ballot titles.
Under the Arkansas version, the sponsors of a proposal must submit a draft of the
petition to the State Attorney General, along with a proposed title and popular
name. 235 The Attorney General either approves the proposal or prepares a more

231. See CAL. ELEc. CODE §§ 9002,9004 (West 1996).
Prior to the circulation of any initiative or referendum petition for signatures, a draft of the
proposed measure shall be submitted to the Attorney General with a written request that a title
and summary of the chief purpose and points of the proposed measure be prepared. The tide and
summary shall not exceed a total of 100 words.
The persons presenting the request shall be known as the "proponents." The Attorney
General shall preserve the written request until after the next general election.
Attorney general; preparation of title and summary; copies to secretary of state; time; fees
Upon receipt of a draft of a petition, the Attorney General shall prepare a summary of the
chief purposes and points of the proposed measure. The summary shall be prepared in the
manner provided for the preparation of ballot titles in Article 5 (commencing with Section
9050), the provisions of which in regard to the preparation, filing, and settlement of titles and
summaries are hereby made applicable to the summary. The Attorney General shall provide a
copy of the title and summary to the Secretary of State within 15 days after receipt of the final
version of a proposed initiative measure, or if a fiscal estimate or opinion is to be included,
within 15 days after receipt of the fiscal estimate or opinion prepared by the Department of
Finance and the Joint Legislative Budget Committee pursuant to Section 9005.
If during the 15-day period, the proponents of the proposed initiative measure submit
amendments, other than technical, nonsubstantive amendments, to the final version of the
measure, the Attorney General shall provide a copy of the title and summary to the Secretary of
State within 15 days after receipt of the amendments.
The proponents of any initiative measure, at the time of submitting the draft of the measure
to the Attorney General, shall pay a fee of two hundred dollars ($200), which shall be placed in
a trust fund in the office of the Treasurer and refunded to the proponents if the measure qualifies
for the ballot within two years from the date the summary is furnished to the proponents. If the
measure does not qualify within that period, the fee shall be immediately paid into the General
Fund of the state.
232. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 9D2 (West 1994).
233. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 9 (West 1994).
234. See id.

235. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107 (Michie 1987).
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suitable one if he finds the proposed rule defective.236 This procedure allows the
sponsors the first option to draft the title, while insuring some independent
mechanism to timely identify potential defects.
Without identifying any particular preference, the involvement of an unbiased
state agency in either reviewing or collaborating in the preparation of ballot titles
or summaries would improve the quality of communication with the electorate
without sacrificing the people's rights to participate in the process. Perhaps the
creation of an independent state commission, with responsibility for drafting ballot
summaries and titles, might also be considered.
Related problems generally arising after the approval of a citizen initiative
petition are drafting problems in the substantive provisions of the petition itself.
Substantive problems are thornier than the ballot summary and title issue.
Some states have attempted to adopt the legislative committee hearing system to
aid in drafting initiative petitions. California, which has long experience with
initiative petitions, requires that copies of the summary of an initiative,237 and upon
certification, copies of the initiative measure the petition23 be transmitted to both
houses of the California legislature. In both instances, the respective chambers of
the legislature are empowered to hold public hearings on the measure, but the
23 9
legislature may not alter the proposal or prevent it from appearing on the ballot.
California also has adopted a process by which, at state expense, arguments pro and
con on a proposal are printed and distributed to the voters in advance of an
election. 2'
While these aids may assist in the public's understanding of a particular initiative
petition, none address the more basic problem of poor draftsmanship in the petition
itself. One state that has attempted to confront this more basic underlying problem
is Colorado.
Colorado law requires the original drafts of all initiative proposals to the state
constitution to be submitted to the directors of the Legislative Council and the

236. See id.
237. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9007 (West 1997). This statute states:

Immediately upon the preparation of the summary of an initiative or referendum petition,

the Attorney General shall forthwith transmit copies of the text of the measure and summary to

the Senate and Assembly. The appropriate committees of each house may hold public hearings
on the subject of the measure. However, nothing in this section shall be construed as authority
for the Legislature to alter the measure or prevent it from appearing on the ballot.
Id.
238. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9034 (West 1997).
Upon the certification of an initiative measure for the ballot, the Secretary of State shall

transmit copies of the initiative measure, together with the ballot title as prepared by the
Attorney General pursuant to Section 9050, to the Senate and Assembly. Each house shall assign
the initiative measure to its appropriate committees. The appropriate committees shall hold joint
public hearings on the subject of such measure prior to the date of the election at which the
measure is to be voted upon. However, no hearing may be held within 30 days prior to the date
of the election.
Id.
Nothing in this section shall be construed as authority for the Legislature to alter the
initiative measure or prevent it from appearing on the ballot.
Id.
239. Id.
240. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9060-9096 (West 1997).
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" ' All executive
Office of Legislative Legal Services for review and comment.24
agencies are authorized to assist in reviewing and preparing comments on a
proposed petition.2'2 After a hearing between the proponents of the petition and the
involved state officials, the proponents are afforded an opportunity to amend the
petition in response to the comments and observation of the state officials. 3 This
procedure would appear to retain sponsor autonomy in the actual drafting of the
petition, while assuring the sponsors sufficient technical legal and drafting advice
to insure that the petition reflects their actual intent.

CONCLUSIONS
Citizen initiative petitions are not perfect. Like any political process, they must
be examined from time to time to determine whether any reforms are needed. The
increased use and scrutiny placed on citizen initiatives in the past few years
indicates rather strongly that the electorate views them as a necessary complement
to the legislative system. Initiatives serve as a necessary outlet for voter frustration,
and permit a level of involvement in politics that the legislature cannot provide.
Citizen initiatives are an important component of the landscape of America's
democratic system. They are one of the very few participatory democratic devices
available in our system, and one of the few devices the electorate can use to control
an unresponsive legislature.
Recent experience indicates increasing problems in the perception and
administration of citizen initiatives. These problems are attributable in part to the
large-scale interjection of special interest economic resources into the initiative
process. Before deciding to place unnecessary restrictions on the use of citizen
initiatives, states should attempt to control the effects of special interest financial
resources on initiative elections by imposing financial reporting and disclosure
requirements on all participants in the initiative process, and by then enforcing them
vigorously.
Similarly, concerns over unnecessary complexities, ballot clutter, and drafting
ambiguities in initiative petitions also need to be confronted. While not
recommending any particularly novel or radical solutions, this Article has attempted
to identify some approaches that might provide necessary reform without unduly
interfering with the electorate's use of the initiative.
It is possible to improve the drafting of initiatives, limit the numbers of initiatives
confronting the electorate at a particular election, and regulate the for-profit
industry that collects qualifying signatures for an initiative. These reforms can be
accomplished while still permitting the electorate to benefit from the process
William Jennings Bryan identified as "the most effective means yet proposed for
giving the people absolute control over their government." 2"
As a final note, I would merely observe that the Federal Constitution was
originally ratified by the non-popularly elected legislatures of only thirteen states,
241.
242.
243.
244.
MORNING

See COL.REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-105 (West 1988).
See id.
See id.
Quoted in Mark Petracca, Initiative and Referendum Process is too Important to Lose, DALLAS
NEws, May 17, 1993 at 15A.
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but not the electorate themselves. State constitutions are the exclusive property of
the state's electorate; statewide electorates adopted them and only statewide
electorates can change them. The people own their state constitution. While the
evolution of state constitution requires judges, lawyers and legal scholars to
envision ways of improving state constitutions, the ultimate decision as to what
should be contained in a state constitution and how a state constitution should be
amended rests not on what those lawyers, judges and academics think are best for
the state, but what the electorate of the state feels is best for them.

